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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the contractual terms that govern the bank-customer 
relationship for online banking that operates in New Zealand and their practical 
effect on the customer. These contractual terms are analysed against the 
backdrop of the technical security measures adopted by banks in their online 
banking services. This paper highlights flaws in the online banking security 
systems and argues that these flaws, combined with the contractual tern1s, 
mean that customers face a disproportionate burden when trying to seek 
recompense for unauthorised transactions. This paper therefore offers some 
advice to customers seeking to challenge unauthorised transactions debited to 
their accounts. Customers may be able to resort to a combination of evidential, 
legal and public policy arguments. However, some of these arguments are such 
that fraudulent customers may be able to take advantage of them too. The paper 
therefore also offers some advice to banks. It conducts a survey of various 
comparative overseas jurisdictions. The practices of these overseas 
jurisdictions show that it is not necessary for contractual terms to be weighted 
so heavily in favour of banks. It suggests some technical measures that banks 
should adopt to address the potential vulnerabilities of the current security 
systems. Combining the legal and technical suggestions of this paper would 
potentially insulate banks against challenges by customers, while also ensuring 
greater practical security for online banking and a fairer and more balanced 
approach for both customers and banks. 
STATEMENT ON WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper ( excluding table of contents, abstract, footnotes, 
appendices and bibliography) comprises approximately 15,765 words. 
Electronic commerce - Banking law - Online banking - Internet banking 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Banking, like most other aspects of commerce, has warmed to electronic 
mediums for carrying out business. "Electronic banking" - the "automated 
delivery of new and traditional banking products and services directly to 
customers through electronic, interactive communication channels" 1 - allows 
bank customers to quickly and conveniently carry out routine banking 
transactions. Electronic banking may be via such methods as the telephone or 
mobile phone "texting". However, probably the most important form of 
electronic banking today is online or internet banking.2 
With little more than a website address, a username and a password, bank 
customers can check their account balances, transfer funds between their 
accounts and update their contact details. Customers may also be able to 
communicate with their bank through secure email, set up facilities to pay bills 
and even make investments or trade securities. Moreover, this convenience is 
portable - customers can initiate transactions from anywhere with an internet 
connection. 
Banks can also make significant cost savmgs through processmg such 
transactions online. Banks may reduce their need for staff to answer questions, 
tally amounts and re-key data. These cost savings usually flow to the customer 
in the form of lower costs for the transactions processed online. 
The cost, convenience and effectiveness of online banking have made it a 
significant factor in the banking environment. The level of customer 
acceptance of online banking can be measured through its use. Statistics 
published by the New Zealand Bankers ' Association3 show that in 2000 there 
1 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Information Technology Examination 
Handbook: £-Banking (Washington DC, USA, 2003) 1. Available at <http://www.ffi ec.2:ov> 
(last accessed 4 Februaty 2006). 
2 A number of other terms, including "remote banking", "cyber banking" and similar, have 
been used interchangeably by various authors. This paper has attempted to use the term "online 
banking" throughout for the sake of consistency, other than where making direct quotations. 3 New Zealand Bankers ' Association Payment Statistics 2004 (Wellington, 2004). Available at 
<http: //www.nzba.org.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
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were approximately 94 million uses of "Personal Computer" banking.
4 In 2004, 
this figure had nearly doubled to approximately 183 million uses.
5 
However, online banking remains a relatively recent development. The 
implications of its various aspects have not yet been fully explored. The 
Banking Ombudsman,6 in her most recent annual report, stated:
7 
Internet banking fraud is new, however, with the consequence that neither 
existing legislation nor the Code [ of Banking Practice] is able to offer clear 
guidance concerning the allocation of risk between banks and their 
customers ... my office is principally guided by the specific form of contract 
between banks and their individual customers ... 
Unfortunately, some banks appear to have updated and amended only some 
sections of their standard contracts when they introduced internet banking 
services, with the consequence that we sometimes identify fundamental 
inconsistencies between different parts of the same contract, making it 
difficult if not impossible to apply their terms in a coherent manner. 
The Law Commission has also observed that the allocation of risk between 
customers and banks may not be appropriate. 
8 The Commission concluded that 
while legislative change would not be appropriate, the 2001 review of the Code 
of Banking Practice should take into account the concems.
9 The 2001 review 
having apparently not done so, the Banking Ombudsman has expressed her 
4 It is not clear what transactions are covered by this figure, however, it does appear to include 
bill payments, funds transfer, credit transactions and debit transactions. 
5 Note that the New Zealand Bankers' Association splits its "Personal Computer" banking into 
" Internet Banking" and "PC Banking" from 2003 onwards. 
6 The Office of the Banking Ombudsman is an independent, private and free alternative dispute 
resolution scheme. The Banking Ombudsman acts under terms of reference established by 
participating banks (most of the major trading banks). Under those terms of reference, the 
Banking Ombudsman may receive and consider complaints against participating banks, and 
has the power to award limited damages for actual loss as well as stress and inconvenience. See 
Office of the Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of Reference 
(Wellington, 2002). The Banking Ombudsman also publishes case notes annually to provide an 
indication to banks and the public of areas of concern or in need of improvement. See generally 
Office of the Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand <http ://www.bankombudsman.org.nz> 
(last accessed 4 February 2006). 
7 Office of the Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Annual Report 2004-2005 (Wellington, 
2005), 4. 
8 New Zealand Law Commission Electronic Commerce Part Three: Remaining Issues (NZLC 
R68, Wellington, 2000), para 63. 
9 New Zealand Law Commission Electronic Commerce Part Three: Remaining Issues, above n 
8, paras 62-69. See also New Zealand Law Commission Electronic Commerce Part Two: A 
Basic Legal Framework (NZLC R58, Wellington, 1999), paras 294-312. 
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hope that the 2005 review of the Code "will help to remove uncertainties and to 
establish standards in this increasingly important area of banking practice." 10 
This paper conducts its own review of the provisions and issues associated with 
online banking. In doing so, it focuses on the direct relationship between bank 
and customer, and situations where the two parties "transact" with each other, 
rather than third party merchants. It also does not consider situations involving 
fraud that happen to be carried out the through the medium of online banking. 11 
This paper begins by setting out some background material relating to the 
technical and legal aspects of online banking. The technical background 
includes a basic framework for considering the risks associated with electronic 
transactions such as online banking (the "PAIN" risks) and an outline of the 
security measures used by New Zealand banks to address these risks. The legal 
background sets out various elements of the bank-customer relationship, 
including the three basic sub-relationships, some common law affecting the 
boundaries of the relationship, and a brief summary of the general contractual 
terms agreed between banks and customers for the provision of banking 
services. 
The paper then turns to the specific contractual terms that govern the bank.-
customer relationship for online banking. It first sets out a summary of the 
relevant clauses, then goes on to analyse their apparent practical effect. As 
indicated by the Banking Ombudsman, 12 there is almost no precedent relating 
to online banking to assist in determining the outcome of any given fact 
situation. However, the similar contractual terms from other related areas of 
banking law and disputes relating to these terms provide a useful comparison. 
This analysis leads to the conclusion that the express terms related to online 
banking are unfortunately heavily weighted in favour of banks over their 
customers. The paper takes issue with this approach, pointing out the 
10 Office of the Banking Ombudsman ofNew Zealand Annual Report 2004-2005, above n 7, 4. 11 See, for example, Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2004-2005 
(Wellington, 2005) 11 , case 3. 
12 Office of the Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Annual Report 2004-2005, above n 7, 4. 
,., 
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difficulties faced by a customer who is in the invidious position of trying to 
have an unauthorised withdrawal refunded. It then moves on to discussing 
some of the potential vulnerabilities in the technical security measures of 
online banking and uses these, along with some legal arguments, to proffer 
some advice to customers with the aim of redressing the balance between bank 
and customer. 
Finally, this paper seeks to offer some advice to banks that could potentially be 
incorporated into the current review of the Code of Banking Practice. In doing 
so, the paper undertakes a comparative assessment of the online banking 
regimes of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. The paper 
concludes by suggesting some legal and technical measures that could usefully 
be incorporated in New Zealand to ensure greater practical security for online 
banking and a fairer and more balanced approach for both customers and banks. 
II TECHNICAL BACKGROUND: ONLINE BANKING SECURITY 
A PAIN 
Four security risks have been identified with e-business transactions: privacy, 
authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation ("PAIN"). 13 Any system seeking 
to conduct e-business securely must address these risks, although the degree to 
which each is addressed will depend on the nature of the specific transaction. 
Online banking has elements of each of these risks. The exchange of sensitive 
information (such as account balances) should be kept private. Only the 
authentic customer should be able to access information and provide 
instructions in relation to his or her accounts. Information exchanged between a 
customer and the bank should be protected in such a way that it cannot be 
interfered with while in transit. Finally (although of less relevance for the 
purposes of this paper), information and instructions should be recorded in 
such a way that prevents subsequent alteration so disputes may be resolved 
impartially. This paper considers the first three security risks. 
13 Stacy Cannady and Thomas Stockton "Easing the PAIN" (IBM, New York NY, USA, 200 l) 
<http://www.ibm.com> (last accessed 10 January 2006). 
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B Technical Security Measures 
Personal online banking in New Zealand today is invariably delivered over the 
worldwide web through the use of an ordinary internet browser. The major 
trading banks (ANZ, 14 National Bank, 15 the Bank of New Zealand, 16 
Westpac, 17 ASB Bank, 18 TSB Bank, 19 HSBC,20 Superbank21 and Kiwibank22) 
all offer online banking access in essentially the same manner: customers 
access the website of their particular bank and enter a distinct user log-on and 
password.23 
All the major trading banks surveyed use 128 bit Secure Sockets Layer ("SSL") 
encryption for online banking. SSL is a series of protocols developed to 
provide secure communications over the internet. In the context of banking, it 
enables customers and banks to exchange confidential information (for 
example, passwords or account balances) with a much reduced risk that 
information can be intercepted in transit. 
I How SSL works 
A secure SSL communication link is established whenever a customer accesses 
his or her bank's website. All the customer has to do is enter the bank' s website 
address. 24 However, a number of more technical steps are carried out 
automatically by the customer' s and bank's computer systems after the 
14 ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as ANZ New Zealand <http://www.anz.co.nz> (last 
accessed 4 February 2006). 
15 ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as the National Bank of New Zealand 
<http://www. nbnz.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
16 Bank of New Zealand <http://www.bnz.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
17 Westpac Banking Corporation (New Zealand division) <http ://www.westpac.co.nz> (last 
accessed 4 February 2006). 
18 ASB Bank Limited <http ://www.asb.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
19 TSB Bank Limited <http://www.tsb.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
20 The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited <http://www.hsbc.co.nz> (last 
accessed 4 February 2006). 
2 1 St George Bank New Zealand Limited, trading as Superbank <http://www.superbank.co.nz> 
(last accessed 4 February 2006). 
22 Kiwibank Limited <http://wwvv. kiwibank.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
23 Some banks do have additional security measures. These are discussed in greater detail 
below. 
24 More technically, its Uniform Resource Locator or "URL" - see Wikipedia (Wikimedia 
Foundation Inc, St Petersburg FL, USA, 2006) "Unifom1 Resource Locator" 
<http://en.wikipedia.org> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
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customer accesses the bank's online banking website. Most customers will not 
r be aware of these steps: ) 
1. The customer sends to the bank a list of infom1ation relating to the 
type of encryption methods he or she is able to use. 
2. The bank chooses the encryption methods and parameters from the 
list sent to it by the customer. 
3. The bank sends a certificate from a certificate authority 26 to the 
customer. 
4. The customer checks the certificate against the list published by the 
relevant certificate authority to ensure it is valid. 
5. The customer and the bank negotiate a common "master secret".27 
This is known as the "handshake" protocol. Once the above steps have been 
completed, the "record" protocol takes over. At its most basic level, the record 
protocol takes the shared master secret and uses it to create a key. The record 
protocol then uses this to encrypt information that is sent to the other party. 
Because the other party also knows the master secret, he or she is able to work 
out the key and decrypt the information. 
This process is most clearly demonstrated by way of a non-internet analogy. 
Suppose Alice needs to exchange some private information with Bob so she 
telephones him (accessing the bank 's online banking website). Alice suggests a 
number of ways they might exchange information securely (step 1 above). Bob 
selects one of Alice's suggested methods, locking a letter in a box with a 
combination lock (step 2). However, at this point, Alice realises that she has 
25 Note that "customer" and "bank" have been substituted for the more technical "client" and 
"server". 
26 The role of certificates and certificate authorities is discussed in greater detail at page 8, 
below. 
27 This master secret can itself be kept confidential through the use of another cryptographic 
method known as "asymmetric" or "public-key cryptography." A detailed discussion of 
asymmetric cryptography is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for further information, 
see, for example, Wikipedia, above n 24, "Public-Key Cryptography" and "Diffie-Hellman Key 
Exchange". 
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never met Bob and wants to be sure of his identity. Bob suggests that she talk 
to his friend, Chris, who will vouch for his identity (step 3). Alice knows Chris 
is trustworthy, so is willing to accept his word that Bob is in fact who he says 
he is (step 4). Assured of Bob' s identity, Alice and Bob then agree the 
combination will be " 1234" plus the numerical date and month on which she 
sends the letter - for example 0402 for 4 February (step 5 - the "master 
secret"). Alice then writes Bob a letter, locks it in the box with the combination 
1636 (the "key") and sends it to Bob. Bob, who already knows the master 
secret and therefore how to work out the key, adds 1234 to the date of the 
postmark on the box, opens the lock and reads the letter. He can then write 
back to Alice using the same method (the record protocol). 
As the name suggests, the handshake protocol essentially involves the 
customer and the bank identifying themselves to each other and working out 
the framework for their future communications. The record protocol then 
utilises the agreed framework to encrypt information exchanged so that one 
party is able to decrypt information encrypted by the other.28 
When a secure SSL communications link has been established using a standard 
browser, a padlock or key symbol appears at the bottom of the browser window 
and the URL changes from "http:// ... " to "https:// .. . ".29 
2 Privacy 
Information exchanged during an SSL connection is encrypted using a key 
based on the master secret. No one can determine any of the information 
exchanged unless they know the key to decrypt the information. Ordinarily this 
should only be the customer and the bank. However, ultimately it would be 
possible for a third party "cracker"30 to try and determine the key simply by 
28 Two additional SSL protocols, the "alert" and "cipher change" protocols play more minor 
roles that are not necessary to discuss for the purposes of this paper. 
29 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Transport Layer Security" and Tomasz Onyszko "Secure Socket 
Layer" [sic] (WindowSecurity.com, 2004) <http://www.windowsecurity .com> (last accessed 
I O January 2006). 
30 The tem1 "cracker" is used to denote a computer "hacker" with malicious intent. See 
Wikipedia, above n 27, "Hacker", "Hacker (computer security)" and " Hacker Definition 
Controversy". 
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trying every possible combination. The security of the key is therefore critical 
to minimise the risks to privacy. 
New Zealand banks all use "strong 128 bit"31 encryption. A bit is a binary digit, 
either 1 or 0. The number of bits refers to the length of the key used to encrypt 
and decrypt information, based on the master secret. 32 A 128 bit key is 
therefore a string of 128 digits - for example: 
0100101010101101010101010111101000010100010100000!000101010100 
00011011011111001010100000001101001010010101101010010101000101 
0100 
A 128 bit key has i 28 possible combinations. That is, 3.4 x 1038 or 340 trillion 
trillion trillion combinations. The world's current fastest supercomputer has 
been recorded as performing 280.6 trillion floating point operations per second 
("teraflops").33 Although this performance would not actually flow through to 
calculating a 128 bit key, even at this speed it would take approximately 3.8 x 
10 16 or 38 thousand trillion years to try all the possible key combinations by 
"brute force". A 128 bit key would therefore appear to be very secure. 
3 Authentication 
The identity of the bank is authenticated in the SSL protocol by use of 
certificates. Certificates are issued by certificate authorities, which are usually 
private companies. A certificate authority certificate essentially provides a 
guarantee from the authority to the customer that the bank (the provider of the 
certificate) is genuine. If they are not, the theory behind the certificate system 
is that the certificate authority will compensate for any loss suffered by the 
person.34 
3 1 Westpac Banking Corporation (New Zealand division) "How secure is online banking?" 
<http: //www.westpac.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
32 See Wikipedia, above n 27, "Transport Layer Security". 
33 The BlueGene/L of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. See Top500.org 
<http: //top500.org> (last accessed 10 January 2006). 
34 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Certificate Authority". However, it should also be noted that while 
all certificate authorities provide "guarantees" of identity, the liability of certificate authorities 
that issue certificates erroneously is unclear. Most certificate authorities provide for some form 
of contractual liability, normally seeking to limit liability to a maximum sum. However, 
customers that have suffered loss due to reliance on erroneous certificates may be able to take 
- 8 -
However, the SSL protocol does not confirm the identity of the customer. Only 
the bank provides a certificate from a certificate authority verifying its validity. 
It is functionally possible within the SSL handshake protocol for both parties to 
provide certificates to each other. However, this is not done for online banking. 
The process for obtaining a valid certificate is likely to be too technical for the 
average banking customer. 
Instead, banks issue customers with unique log-ons and passwords. The 
customer must enter these correctly before being able to use online banking. 
This is to authenticate the identity of the customer. Most banks recommend or 
require35 a password of at least six characters that includes a mix of upper and 
lowercase letters and numbers.36 There are around 726 possible combinations 
for such a six-character password. 37 That is, 1.39 x 10 11 or nearly 140 billion 
possible combinations. The number of combinations increases markedly for 
each additional character added to the password. The chance of a cracker 
randomly guessing an appropriately chosen password is therefore remote. 
Further, some banks disable an online banking account following three 
unsuccessful log-on attempts.38 Only having three guesses makes it even more 
unlikely a cracker could randomly guess a log-on and password. 
However, the log-on and password process is separate from the SSL protocols. 
In fact , an SSL connection is already in place when the customer sends their 
log-on and password to the bank. This prevents third parties from intercepting 
log-on and password details. 
other actions, for example, a claim in tort for negligent misstatement. Full consideration of the 
liability of certificate authorities is beyond the scope of this paper. 
35 Some banks appear to do this technically by only allowing customers to enter a password 
that satisfies the criteria. Others provide for this criterion in the express terms relating to the 
use of on line banking. 
36 See, for example, ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as the National Bank of New 
Zealand "Change my password" <http://"vww.nbnz.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
37 26 letters plus I O numerals multiplied by 2 for upper and lowercase equals 72 . This may be 
greater or lesser for some banks, depending on whether they allow certain characters such as 
punctuation marks or the special characters obtained by pressing "shift" and a numeral. 
38 The banks surveyed by this paper do not appear to publish information relating to 
unsuccessful log-ons and it was not possible to confirm how many observe this practice. 
Anecdotally, however, it seems widespread. 
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Integrity 
SSL provides privacy by encrypting infom1ation that is to be exchanged 
between customer and bank. Although it would be difficult to decrypt and read 
information encrypted using 128 bit SSL encryption, it is possible to interfere 
with it encrypted. Computer data, even encrypted, is ultimately no more than 
strings of 1 s and Os. It is possible to change some of these digits ( even if only 
destructively) or prevent the exchange of data at all. 
SSL also addresses this risk. All information to be exchanged is divided up into 
smaller blocks before being encrypted. Each block is numbered sequentially, 
enabling the receiver of the information to determine whether any blocks have 
been intercepted.39 Further, each block contains a "hash" of itself. A hash is a 
one-way mathematical algorithm that converts a set of data into (typically) an 
alphanumeric string. The fundamental property of hash functions is that 
different outputs are produced for each different input, even if the inputs vary 
only slightly. For example, hashing the previous sentence in this paragraph 
using the common SHA-1 hash function40 produces the result:41 
a93b4ll2e474108ab50cal6ed3ac66035814d652 
But even as small a variation as changing the capital "T" at the start of the 
sentence to lowercase produces quite a different hash: 
65adc962520310c58d4112d6e4c6f7fd48a4aal9 
By passing the information received through the same hash function and 
comparing the result with the hash received, it is possible to determine whether 
any changes have been made while the information was in transit.42 
The combination of sequential numbering and hashing ensures data cannot 
easily be intercepted or altered without detection. Both the sequential number 
39 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Transport Layer Security", and Onyszko, above n 29. 
40 The SHA- I hash function has recently been cracked and so can no longer be considered fully 
secure (see Wikipedia, above n 27, "SHA Hash Functions"). However, it is still in common use 
and provides a demonstration of how hash functions work. 
4 1 Hash calculators are freely available on the internet. See, for example, Serversniff.net 
<http://serversniff.net> (last accessed 11 January 2006). 
42 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Hash Function". 
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and the hash are also encrypted to ensure the pnvacy of this important 
information. 
5 Advantages 
In addition to the level of security described above, SSL has the maJor 
advantage of being widely accepted. SSL can provide security for many 
different sorts of applications, including the World Wide Web (the HTTP 
protocol). There is no need to implement separate security measures for 
different applications and protocols. 
The acceptance of SSL has been extended to internet browsing software. SSL 
encryption is supported natively (that is, without the need to install additional 
software) in all recent internet browsers. 
Because of this general acceptance, the fact that there is no need to install 
additional software, and its relative security, 128 bit SSL encryption is the 
preferred means of securing electronic commerce transactions, including online 
banking.43 
Ill LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE BANK-CUSTOMER 
RELATIONSHIP 
A The Basic Sub-relationships 
The legal relationship between banks and their customers involves a number of 
separate sub-relationships. Take the simple example of a customer that has 
deposited funds with a bank. Firstly, the bank is the debtor of the customer, 
owing a debt equal to the amount of the deposit. Correspondingly, the customer 
is the creditor of the bank. Secondly, there is a contractual relationship 
associated with the creditor-debtor relationship. The bank agrees to honour the 
customer' s instructions (or "mandate") for the repayment of the debt the bank 
owes to the customer. Finally, the bank is the agent of the customer. This sub-
43 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Transport Layer Security", and Onyszko, above n 29. 
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relationship arises when the bank acts on behalf of the customer in making 
payments from, or receiving deposits into, the customer' s account. 44 
B Implied Terms: the Customer's Duty of Care 
The debtor and agency relationships between a bank and its customers are 
essentially unilateral. A bank assumes obligations in respect of its customers. 
However, the contractual relationship necessarily involves mutual obligations. 
The bank agrees to obey the customer' s mandate, while the customer assumes 
a number of obligations in respect of the bank. These are usually contained in 
the express terms of the agreement between bank and customer and are 
discussed further below. 
Perhaps the most significant of these obligations is the customer' s duty of care 
in respect of the bank. This may arise from the express terms of the bank-
customer agreement. However, even if it does not, the courts have introduced a 
duty of care as an implied term of the contractual relationship between banks 
and customers. 
In a line of cases culminating in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Limited v Liu Chong 
Hing Bank Limited and Others,45 a case concerning unauthorised transactions 
due to cheque fraud, the courts examined the extent of the duties customers 
owe to their banks. Earlier judgments had introduced what was described as the 
"narrow" duty of care - that a customer "must exercise due care in drawing his 
cheques so as not to facilitate fraud or forgery and he must inform his bank at 
once of any unauthorised cheques of which he becomes aware." 46 The 
customer argued that this was the proper extent of the duty. Under this 
44 Electronic Business and Technology law (NZ) (Service 12, LexisNexis NZ Limited, March 
2005) Introduction to Electronic Banking para 20.5 <http: //www.lexisnex is.co.nz> (last 
accessed l O January 2006). 
45 
[ 1986] AC 80 (PC) Lord Scarman for their Lordships [Tai Hing]. 
46 Tai Hing, above n 45, I 08 Lord Scarman for their Lordships, affirming the earlier decisions 
of London Joint Stock Bank Limited v Macmillan [1918] AC 777 (HL) and Greenwood v 
Martins Bank Limited [ 1933] AC 51 (HL). This position was essentially adopted in New 
Zealand in Bank of New Zealand v The Auckland Information Bureau (Incorporated) [1996] I 
NZLR 420 (CA). 
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approach, the customer would be entitled to recover the value of the 
unauthorised transactions. 
On the other hand, the bank argued that customers owed their banks a "wider" 
duty of care to:47 
exercise such precautions as a reasonable customer in his position would take 
to prevent forged cheques being presented to the bank ... or, at the very least 
to check his monthly ... bank statements so as to be able to notify the bank of 
any items which were not, or may not have been, authorised by him. 
If this were accepted, the customer would be estopped from denying the 
authority of the payments from its account and the bank would not have to 
repay the amount of the unauthorised transactions. 
Their Lordships ultimately decided that customers do not owe their banks any 
wider duty, only the narrow duty. 48 The customer therefore recovered the 
amount of the unauthorised transactions. 
The Tai Hing line of cases was in relation to a specific form of instruction or 
mandate of a customer to the bank, that of a cheque. However, the reasoning 
seems equally applicable to any form of mandate. For example, New Zealand 
courts have applied Tai Hing to direct credits.49 
C Express Terms: Conditions for the Provision of Banking Services 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held in Tai Hing that customers 
owe their banks a duty of care as an implied term of the contractual 
relationship. However, an implied term can be superseded by an express term 
dealing with the same matter. Indeed, one of the rationales in Tai Hing for 
refusing to extend a wider implied duty of care to customers was that banks are 
perfectly free to dictate their express terms of business if "the banking business 
47 Tai Hing, above n 45, 97 Lord Scarman for their Lordships. 
48 Tai Hing, above n 45, I 08 Lord Scarman for their Lordships. 
49 Bank of New Zealand v The Auckland Information Bureau (Incorporated), above n 46. In 
this case the direct credits were regular salary payments by the Auckland Information Bureau 
to its employees. 
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[has become] so burdensome that [there] should be ... a reciprocal increase of 
responsibility placed upon the customer". so 
New Zealand does not have any statutory regulation of the bank-customer 
relationship. Rather, banks in New Zealand have adopted detailed sets of terms 
and conditions to regulate the provision of banking services, including online 
banking. However, through the New Zealand Bankers' Association the major 
trading banks in New Zealand have produced the Code of Banking Practice. 51 
The Code guides many of the matters that are addressed in individual bank's 
express terms. It is binding on member banks, and compliance is monitored by 
the Banking Ombudsman. 52 
The standard terms and conditions for the prov1s1on of banking services 
include a number of express terms. To the average customer, the most obvious 
is probably the obligation to pay bank fees. However, a number of other 
matters are included as well. For example, and particularly relevant in light of 
the decision in Tai Hing, 53 customers must check their account statements for 
accuracy and advise their bank of any discrepancies as soon as possible. 54 The 
express terms will also include clauses governing the use of specific accounts 
or transaction services such as "EFTPOS" 55 cards, cheques and automatic 
payments. 56 
50 Tai Hing, above n 45 , I 05-106 Lord Scarman for their Lordships. 
51 New Zealand Bankers' Association Code of Banking Practice (Third Edition, Wellington, 
2002). Available at <http: //www.nzba.org.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006) [New Zealand 
Code of Banking Practice]. 
52 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cl 1.1. 
53 Above n 45. 
54 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51 , cl 4(c). See also, for example, Bank of 
New Zealand "Standard Terms and Conditions", cl 6 <http://www.bnz.co.nz> (last accessed 4 
February 2006) and ASB Bank Limited "Personal Banking Terms and Conditions", 2 
<http: //www.asb.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
55 EFTPOS stands for "Electronic Funds Transfer at Point-Of-Sale". See Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand Payment and Settlement Systems in New Zealand (Wellington, 2003). Available at 
<http: //www.rbnz.govt.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
56 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51. See also, for example, Bank of New 
Zealand Limited "Standard Terms and Conditions", above n 54 and ASB Bank Limited 
"Personal Banking Terms and Conditions", above n 54. 
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IV EXPRESS TERMS FOR ONLINE BANKING 
The express term approach is also used in the context of online banking. This 
paper addresses these express terms in three broad categories: mandate, 
security and liability. 
A Mandate 
Hard copy signatures (in the sense of squiggles on paper) have been the 
essential element for authorising instructions for many centuries. 57 Express 
terms in bank-customer agreements attempt to import a similar sense of 
authorisation to transactions in the electronic environment. 
Mandate is not addressed by the Code of Banking Practice. However, the 
current practice among New Zealand banks is to provide that using an online 
banking log-on and password essentially provides sufficient mandate to 
process transactions (the "mandate clause" 58). An example of this clause is: 59 
Anyone using your Customer ID and Internet password will be allowed 
access to your accounts, whether they are authorised by you to do so or not. 
[The bank] will have no obligation, or take any further steps, to verify any 
instruction received from you or appearing to be sent by you via Online 
Banking. 
B Liability 
Banks also include express terms relating to liability arising from the use of 
online banking. 60 
57 Currently embodied in New Zealand in the Bills of Exchange Act 1908. This was itself a 
consolidation of a number of earlier statutes. The requirements for negotiable instruments 
generally can be traced back to the law merchant - see Goodson v Hawera lawn Tennis and 
Croquet Club Inc [ 1931] NZLR I 096, I 100 - I IOI (Supreme Court) Reed J. 
58 Appendix 1 sets out a I ist of the concepts that are defined and used by this paper. See page I, 
below. 
59 Westpac Banking Corporation (New Zealand division) "Online Banking Terms and 
Conditions" <http://www.westpac.co.nzJ> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
60 The following terms are based largely on the New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above 
n 51 , cl 3.9. However, see also, for example, ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as the 
National Bank of New Zealand "Online Banking Conditions of Use (Version 11)" 
<http://http://www.nbnz.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006), ASB Bank Limited "FastNet 
Classic: Terms and Conditions" <http: //www.asb.co.nz/> (last accessed 4 February 2006) and 
Westpac Banking Corporation "Online Banking Terms and Condition's, above n 59. 
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1 Notification clause 
First, the express terms provide an incentive for customers to notify banks of 
potential issues early. The "notification clause" provides that a customer is not 
liable for any loss occurring after the customer notifies that bank of any actual 
or possible security breach. Security breaches may include such things as 
unauthorised transactions. 61 
2 No liability clause 
Second, the terms provide that the customer will not be liable for the following 
(the "no liability clause"): 62 
• Unauthorised transactions that occur before the customer is registered 
to use online banking; 
• Fraudulent or negligent conduct by the bank' s employees or agents (the 
"no liability (fraud) clause"); 
• Faults or errors that occur in the online banking systems or software, 
other than errors that are obvious or advised by message or notice on 
display (the "no liability ( error) clause"); or 
• Any other unauthorised transaction where the customer could not have 
contributed to the loss. 
3 Limited liability clause 
Finally, where neither of the above clauses apply, the terms provide that the 
customer will only be liable for $50 or the actual loss (whichever is lower) 
stemming from an unauthorised transaction (the "limited liability clause"). 
However, the limited liability clause does not apply where the customer has 
acted fraudulently, negligently, breached the express terms or otherwise 
contributed to the loss. 63 
61 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51 , cl 3.9(c). 
62 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51 , cls 3.9(a) and (f). 
63 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cl 3.9(d). 
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(a) Fraud 
Where the customer has acted fraudulently, the express terms provide that he 
or she will be absolutely liable for any loss, including loss suffered by others.64 
(b) Negligence 
Where a customer has acted negligently, he or she will be not be able to take 
advantage of the limited liability clause. 65 Instead, the maximum liability will 
be the lesser of: 66 
• The actual loss; 
• The maximum amount that should have been allowed by the daily 
transaction limit;67 or 
• The loss up to the balance of the customer's account (including 
overdraft facilities). 
There is no further definition of negligence. It can therefore presumably be 
taken to have its ordinary meaning. 
( c) Breaching terms and conditions / otherwise contributing to the loss 
Although treated separately in the Code of Banking Practice, several banks 
treat these elements the same. In any event, the examples given for otherwise 
contributing to the loss (such as selecting inappropriate passwords and keeping 
written records of passwords) amount to breaching the terms and conditions -
specifically, the password clause (this is discussed further below). 68 The 
maximum liability is the same as for negligence. 
64 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cl 3.9(d)(i). See also, in particular, ANZ 
National Bank Limited, trading as the National Bank of New Zealand "Online Banking 
Conditions of Use (Version 11)", above n 60. 
65 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cl 3.9(d)(i). 
66 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cl 3 .9(d). 
67 Most banks impose a daily transaction limit for online banking to minimise potential losses 
stemm ing from security breaches. 
68 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cls 3.9(d)(ii) and 3.9(d)(iii). See also, in 
particular, ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as the National Bank of New Zealand "Online 
Banking Conditions of Use (Version 11)", above n 60. 
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C Security 
Finally, the express terms contain a number of provisos relating to passwords 
(the "password clause").69 The customer is obliged to generally "safeguard" his 
or her password. This includes committing it to memory, taking care when 
entering it so as not to be observed and regularly changing it. Further, the 
customer must not: 70 
• Choose an obvious or easily-guessed password (such as names, 
sequential numbers, birthdays, telephone numbers, addresses) ; 
• Store the password anywhere, in written or electronic form; 
• Keep any record of the password in a form that can be readily 
identified; 
• Disclose his or her password to any other person; or 
• Leave his or her computer unattended while logged on to online 
banking. 
Finally, the customer is also required to contact the bank as soon as possible if 
any record containing his or her password is lost, stolen or becomes known to 
someone else. 
Where the customer breaches the password clause, he or she will not be able to 
take advantage of the limited liability clause. 
V PRACTICAL EFFECT 
A For Example 
Suppose that a customer, Gus Tommer, logs on to his bank' s online banking 
service and authorises a transaction of $10. However, when he checks his bank 
statement later that month, he notices that an additional $1 ,000 has been 
69 The following terms are again based largely on the New Zealand Bankers ' Association New 
Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51 , cl 3.7. However, they also incorporate 
elements of banks ' terms and Conditions. See, for example, Westpac Banking Corporation 
"Online Banking Terms and Conditions", above n 59, ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as 
the National Bank of New Zealand "Online Banking Conditions of Use (Version 11 )", above n 
60, and ASB Bank Limited "FastNet Classic: Terms and Conditions", above n 60. 
70 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51 , cls 3.7(c) and (d). 
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debited from his account. Gus did not authorise the $1,000 transaction and 
complains to his bank. The bank, relying on the express terms, refuses to 
refund him. 
B Precedent 
There is little precedent relating to online banking to assist in determining the 
practical effect of the express terms applied to any given fact situation. 
However, the online banking clauses appear to be closely modelled on the 
terms and conditions relating to the use of EFTPOS and credit cards 71 and 
telephone banking,72 particularly in relation to "PINs".73 The Code of Banking 
Practice even covers most of the online banking provisions within the same 
clauses as EFTPOS, credit cards and telephone banking. 74 
The effect of these EFTPOS and credit card and telephone banking terms have 
frequently been considered by the Banking Ombudsman. 75 These decisions 
provide some valuable guidance as to the practical effect of the express terms 
associated with online banking. 
C Security Assumptions 
Much of the following is based on the premise that online banking is "secure" 
due to the technical security measures implemented by banks. While this paper 
takes issue with this premise (discussed further below), assume for the purpose 
71 Credit cards have some slightly different provisions relating to unauthorised transactions 
with third parties. In certain circumstances, it is possible to "chargeback" disputed transactions 
through the international credit card organisation that issued the card. Although the process is 
complicated, in certain circumstances it is easier to reverse a disputed transaction made with a 
credit card than the same transaction made with a debit card. However, this relates to 
transactions with third-parties. It is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. For more 
information on the chargeback regime, see Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note 
Compendium 2001-2002 (Wellington, 2002), 3 and Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case 
Note Compendium 2002-2003 (Wellington, 2003), 26. 
72 See, for example, ANZ National Bank Limited, trading as the National Bank of New 
Zealand Cashpoint Card: Conditions of Use (Wellington, 2005) and ANZ National Bank 
Limited, trading as the National Bank of New Zealand Thoroughbred, Visa and Freestyle: 
Conditions of Use (Wellington, 2005). 
73 "PIN" stands for Personal Identification Number. 
74 New Zealand Bankers' Association New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cls 
3.7 and 3.9. 
75 Office of the Banking Ombudsman ofNew Zealand case notes. See above, n 6. 
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of this section that the use of 128 bit SSL encryption does in fact make online 
banking secure. This leads to the following propositions: 
S 1. The technical security measures implemented by banks make online 
banking secure. 
Therefore: 
S2. There 1s no way to send the bank an instruction to make a 
transaction, other than by using the customer's password. 
The presumption that the only way to make transactions is by use of a 
customer's password (the "security presumption") is important. It plays a 
crucial role in considering both the mandate and liability clauses discussed 
below. 
D Mandate 
The mandate clause provides legal authority that logging on equals mandate. 
When the security presumption discussed above is combined with the mandate 
clause, the following line of reasoning applies: 
S2. There is no way to send the bank an instruction to make a 
transaction, other than by using the customer's password. 
So if: 
Ml. The bank has received an instruction to make a transaction. 
Then S2 +Ml= 
M2. The transaction must have been made usmg the customer's 
password. 
Therefore, by virtue of the mandate clause: 
M3. The transaction is authorised by the customer. 
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The security presumption appears to provide a foundation for the mandate 
clause. However, a further outcome emerges when the security presumption is 
combined with the password clause: 
M4. Only the customer knows his or her password. 
Therefore M2 + M4 = 
MS. The instruction to make a transaction must have come from the 
customer. 
This latter line of reasoning provides an important practical consideration. By 
creating a presumption that the customer authorised the transaction, banks are 
able to shift the burden of proof to the customer to raise sufficient evidence to 
show that the transactions were not authorised. There are therefore both legal 
and evidential presumptions that a transaction has been authorised by the 
customer (the "authorisation presumption"). In order to recover the value of his 
unauthorised transaction, Gus would have to raise sufficient evidence to rebut 
this presumption. 
This is demonstrated in a 2001-2002 decision of the Banking Ombudsman.76 
Mr C was adamant that he was the victim of unauthorised transactions. 
However, Mr C was unable to provide evidence that he had not initiated the 
transactions himself and the transactions did not conform to the usual pattern of 
fraud. The Banking Ombudsman therefore concluded that the most likely 
explanation was that Mr C was responsible for the transactions himself. 
E Limited Liability 
The limited liability clause seems to loosen some of the apparent harshness of 
the authorisation presumption. The bank may have received an ostensible 
mandate from Gus to debit his account $1 ,000. But if Gus can rebut the 
authorisation presumption by raising sufficient evidence to prove that the 
76 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 200/-2002, above n 71 , 40, case 
40. 
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ostensible mandate was not really authorised by him, the liability clauses may 
be triggered. 
Under the limited liability clause, Gus will only be liable for $50 (that is, the 
bank will re-credit him the $950 balance), subject to the provisos of the clause. 
However, these provisos are important. Gus would not able to limit his liability 
to $50 if he had acted negligently or otherwise contributed to the loss. In 
practice, "otherwise contributing to the loss" amounts to breach of the express 
terms, particularly the password clause. 
Some of the terms of the password clause may be difficult for the average 
customer to comply with on their face. For example, the password clause 
requires customers not to choose obvious passwords and not to write 
passwords down. But there are many sorts of services (both online and offline) 
that require passwords or identification codes that have similar requirements. It 
is likely to be impossible for customers to remember such a wide array of 
unique passwords, particularly if the service or password is not used often. 
Many customers may struggle to comply with these requirements. 
Such terms appear harsh on their face. However, when combined with the 
security presumption, even more significant implications arise. 
1 Limited liability and technology - the fault presumption 
The security presumption gives rise to a line of reasoning that leads to the 
authorisation presumption. This means that the onus is on Gus to raise 
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of authorisation. However, the 
security presumption, combined with Gus' own rebuttal of authorisation and 
the provisions of the password clause, leads to a further line of reasoning: 
S2. There is no way to send the bank an instruction to make a 
transaction, other than by using the customer's password. 
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So if: 
11. The transaction is unauthorised (Gus' rebuttal of the authorisation 
presumption). 
Then S2 + 11 = 
12. Someone other than the customer knows the customer's password. 
But: 
13. The customer is responsible for his or her password (the password 
clause). 
Therefore 12 + 13 = 
14. The customer must be responsible for someone else learning his or 
her password. 
This creates a res ipsa loquitur77 ("the facts speak for themselves") evidential 
presumption that the customer is at fault, either by being negligent in his or her 
security practices or breaching the password clause (the "fault presumption"). 
This again shifts the evidential burden to Gus to show that he was not at fault, 
rather than the bank to show that he was. 
2 Banking Ombudsman 
The Banking Ombudsman has described the approach she takes to such matters 
as:78 
There is often no direct evidence as to how the offender became aware of the 
PIN. I am satisfied that it cannot be obtained from the card itself and I have 
no evidence of deficiencies in the security of banks' technology. 
Accordingly, in the absence of any other explanation, it is most likely that an 
offender has obtained knowledge of the PIN from the cardholder. The 
question therefore is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the offender 
77 Scott v London and St Katherine Docks Company ( 1865) 3 H & C 596; 159 ER 665 
(Exchequer Chamber). See generally DL Mathieson QC (ed) Cross on Evidence (NZ) (Service 
40, LexisNexis NZ Limited, December 2005) para 4.27 - Res ipsa loquitur 
<http: // lexisnexis.co.nz> (last accessed 13 January 2006). 
78 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2001-2002, above n 71, 37. 
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was able to obtain knowledge of the PIN through a breach by the customer of 
the conditions of use on which the card was issued. Generally speaking, if 
there is a reasonable explanation for the offender's access to the P!N and the 
explanation does not involve a breach of the conditions of use, then the 
cardholder is entitled to reimbursement. lf there is no reasonable explanation 
that does not involve a breach of the conditions of use, then the cardholder is 
not entitled to reimbursement. 
This shows the logical progression that leads from the security presumption to 
the fault presumption. Because the Banking Ombudsman has no evidence of 
deficiencies in security technology, the most likely reason for an unauthorised 
transaction is a breach of the express terms by the customer. The phrasing "in 
the absence of any other explanation ... " also demonstrates that the onus is on 
the customer to show he or she was not at fault. 
And if the reverse burden of proof were not enough of itself, the Banking 
Ombudsman has concluded there are also several elements to it. 
3 Fault presumption part 1: breach of the password clause 
Gus must firstly show that he did not breach the password clause. However, 
this is not likely to be easy, given the fault presumption's reverse burden of 
proof. 
This presumption 1s clearly demonstrated in a 2002-2003 decision of the 
Banking Ombudsman. 79 A customer, V, had her credit card stolen. Before she 
reported it stolen, the thief used it to withdraw $2,000 cash, using V's PIN 
correctly at the first attempt. V' s bank refused to reimburse her, saying that she 
must have breached the terms of the card by not taking reasonable care of it 
and the associated PIN. 
Due to the circumstances of the case, the Banking Ombudsman concluded that 
the only way the thief could have obtained V' s PIN was due to V breaching the 
terms and conditions of the card by choosing either an easily guessed PIN or 
having a written record of the PIN with the card. V, unable to raise any 
evidence to the contrary, was liable for the full $2,000. 
79 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2002-2003, above n 71, 34, case 
3 l. 
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The burden was upon V to show that she did not breach the terms and 
conditions of the card, not on the bank to show that she did. 
4 Fault presumption part 2: reasonable explanation required 
Because the list of prohibited acts in the password clause is not exhaustive, 
banks include a catchall proviso in the form of negligence as a part of the 
limited liability clause. This covers circumstances where a password or access 
code is learnt from a customer without that customer necessarily breaching the 
password clause. If the password has been disclosed negligently, the customer 
will be liable even if they have not breached the password clause. Again, the 
fault presumption means that the burden of proof lies with Gus. 
However, under the Banking Ombudsman' s approach discussed above, the 
burden on Gus is potentially even greater than that under the password clause. 
Under the password clause, Gus "merely" has to show that he did not do one of 
the prohibited acts. To disprove negligence, Gus has to put forward positive 
evidence showing that there was a reasonable explanation for the unauthorised 
transaction. 
This element of the fault presumption is demonstrated in another 2002-2003 
decision. 80 Mr K was the victim of a purportedly professional scam in London. 
Immediately after making a withdrawal from an "ATM",
81 a thief approached 
him and tapped him on the shoulder, saying he had dropped some money. 
When Mr K bent down to look, the thief stole the card and later made some 
$6,000 of withdrawals. Mr K' s bank refused to refund him, maintaining that he 
must not have taken reasonable care, as the offender was able to steal both card 
and PIN. 
In the circumstances of the case, the Banking Ombudsman concluded that Mr 
K' s PIN must have been observed by the thief "shoulder surfing" Mr K as he 
80 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2002-2003, above n 71 , 38, case 
38. 
8 1 "ATM" stands for Automated Teller Machine. 
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entered his PIN at the A TM just before the theft. Being shoulder surfed is not 
included on the list of prohibited acts in the password clause. 
Mr K claimed that he was always very careful because he was aware of the 
increasing prevalence of A TM crime in London. However, the Banking 
Ombudsman concluded that Mr K cannot have been careful enough. If he were, 
" it seemed likely the offenders would have targeted someone else." The 
offender must have obtained the PIN somehow (by virtue of the security 
presumption), and therefore Mr K must have failed to take reasonable care (the 
fault presumption). 82 
This is further compounded by the security presumption. This provides that the 
only way for a transaction to be made is by the use of the customer' s log-on 
and password. Gus cannot therefore raise evidence of any explanation for how 
the unauthorised transaction came about - for example, some sort of 
technology-based breach. Gus must admit that his password was disclosed, and 
put forward a reasonable explanation as to how it came to be disclosed. 
5 Causation 
Finally, there does not even have to be a demonstrable link between the breach 
and the unauthorised transaction. 
Another 2002-2003 decision provides a useful example.83 Mr and Mrs S were 
burgled. Shortly after the burglary, a number of unauthorised telephone 
banking transactions were made, totalling some $15 ,000. 
Mr and Mrs S admitted that their PIN had been written down amongst other 
personal documents, however in disguised form. There was no evidence that 
the burglar had discovered the PIN, let alone decoded it. However, the Banking 
82 Mr K was, however, able to recover some money due to the Banking Ombudsman applying a 
contributory negligence approach. Under this approach, loss is apportioned depending on the 
degree of fault. This approach of apportioning loss is somewhat curious, given that the bank 
wears the portion of the loss that a third party causes. However, a detailed analysis of this 
approach is beyond the scope of this paper. 
8 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2002-2003, above n 71 , 55, case 
56. 
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Ombudsman found Mr and Mrs S had breached the password clause, and 
would therefore be liable.84 
F No Liability 
In addition to the limited liability clause, the express terms also provide for no 
liability where there has been fraud on the part of bank staff or due to technical 
errors with the online banking systems. 85 
It will probably be difficult for Gus to take advantage of the no liability (fraud) 
provision. Fraud is always a difficult matter to prove, and it is likely to be 
difficult for Gus to obtain the necessary evidence. 
It will also be difficult for Gus to utilise the no liability ( error) clause. The 
security presumption applies equally to this situation. Since online banking 
systems are secure, there is a presumption that there cannot be any errors that 
someone could exploit to make unauthorised transactions. Therefore there is no 
way for Gus to rebut the bank' s assertion there were no technical faults at the 
time of the transaction. The Banking Ombudsman herself has stated that "I 
have no evidence of deficiencies in the security of banks ' technology."86 This 
is similar to the fault presumption in the context of the limited liability clause. 
G Net Effect 
The view could be taken that the net effect of the express terms of the 
contractual arrangements between banks and customers is to enable a useful 
new service for the benefits of both parties. And such contractual provision is 
necessary because the government has not seen fit to provide legal certainty 
around the legal status of private electronic transactions.87 At the same time, 
the express terms ensure that an honest and diligent customer will only ever be 
84 Mr and Mrs S actually managed to recover some of the money from the bank, however this 
was due to an unrelated technicality. 
85 Assuming the unauthorised transactions did not occur before Gus registered for online 
banking. 
86 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2001-2002, above n 71 , 37. 
87 Electronic Transactions Act 2002, s 14. Contrast with the United States - see 15 USC § 1693 
and page 54, below. 
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liable for $50 of unauthorised transactions prior to notifying the bank, and not 
liable at all for any transactions that occur after notification. The default 
position is that the bank voluntarily assumes liability for unauthorised 
transactions. The customer is only liable in a specific range of circumstances 
where he or she is at fault. Customers, as the weak link in the security 
arrangements, should rightly face the consequences of their own lax security. 
However, taking quite a different perspective, the express terms could also be 
viewed as unduly favouring the interests of banks at the expense of their 
customers. This paper contends that this is the conect perspective to take of 
existing online banking terms and conditions. The real net effect of the express 
terms is to shift essential elements of the burden of proof from the bank to the 
customer. Shifting these elements means that a customer must negotiate a 
difficult series of hurdles to claim back funds debited in an unauthorised 
transaction. 
Firstly, Gus is obliged to check his statements regularly for any unauthorised 
transactions. 88 The obligation is on Gus to bring any potentially unauthorised 
transactions to his bank' s attention. If he fails to do so, he would breach his 
implied duty of care and be estopped from claiming the transactions were 
unauthorised. 89 
Next, Gus faces an evidential burden to show that the transactions were not 
authorised. The authorisation presumption, built on the security presumption 
and the mandate and password clauses, means that Gus must raise sufficient 
evidence to rebut the presumption that the transaction was not authorised. 
However, Gus may find that his rebuttal of the authorisation presumption 
works against him in determining whether he is entitled to take advantage of 
the limited liability clause. The security presumption, combined with the 
password clause and Gus' rebuttal leads to the fault presumption. This means 
Gus will be deemed responsible for unauthorised transactions unless he can 
88 The notification clauses precluding any further liability post notification adds some 
incentives here too. 
89 Tai Hing, above n 45. See also above n 46, and accompanying text. 
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meet a further reverse burden of proof. Discharging this burden is likely to be 
extremely difficult. Gus must show that there is both a reasonable explanation 
for how his password came to be disclosed (the security presumption means he 
must admit that it was disclosed), and that he did not breach the terms of the 
password clause. However, there is a real risk that he will find himself in a 
"catch-22" situation trying to satisfy both limbs. Admitting that his password 
was disclosed may expose him to allegations that he breached the password 
clause. Even if he had behaved entirely reasonably, but still breached one of 
the terms of the password clause, he will be liable. Similarly, if he had 
scrupulously adhered to the password clause, but was otherwise found to be 
negligent, he will be liable. 
Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the limited liability clause limits Gus ' 
liability to $50. So even if Gus is able to detect and report the unauthorised 
$1 ,000 transaction, prove that he did not authorise it and further prove that 
there is a reasonable explanation for how his password came to be disclosed 
that doesn' t breach the password clause, the bank will charge him $50 for his 
trouble. 
The no liability (error) clause is, if anything, even more unlikely to be of 
assistance to Gus. The security presumption also makes it impossible for Gus 
to maintain that there was an error with online banking security. 
VI BUT IS ONLINE BANKING "SECURE"? 
The previous section of this paper criticised the practical effect of the express 
terms governing the use of online banking. However, if online banking is in 
fact secure, and there are no other possible ways the security of online banking 
can be compromised, the presumptions would be well-founded and the 
criticisms unjustified. Unfortunately, that does not appear to be the case. 
This section of the paper presents a number of possible flaws in online banking 
security. It outlines some of the limitations of SSL, banks' primary technical 
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security measure. These limitations are such that weaknesses arise in two broad 
areas: bank practices and attacks by "crackers".
90 
A Limitations of SSL 
SSL is generally very good at what it does: protecting the privacy and integrity 
of infom1ation exchanged between bank and customer. However, privacy and 
integrity are not really all that important for unauthorised transactions. 
I Customer authentication 
Assume the counterfactual: that SSL is not used and communications between 
bank and customer are not encrypted ( other than the initial log-on and 
password). A cracker seeking to steal funds would not actually be able to affect 
either the customer or the bank directly. Rather, he or she would be limited to 
viewing and changing information and instructions in transit. This would 
certainly mean that the customer' s privacy would be compromised. While of 
concern to the customer, it is not actually likely to be of much interest to a 
cracker concerned with theft. The integrity of the information may also be 
affected. However, the very best result for the cracker in this regard would be 
intercepting an instruction to pay funds to someone, and altering the payee's 
name and account number to the cracker' s own (and probably increasing the 
amount). Compromising the privacy and integrity of information (other than a 
password) does not necessarily give a cracker the ability to instruct the bank to 
make unauthorised transactions. 
In the PAIN framework, it is rather authenticity (mandate) that is of most 
interest to crackers. But SSL does not provide any technical security guarantee 
that information and instructions apparently coming from the customer are 
actually from that customer. Authenticity is rather the realm of the customer' s 
log-on and password. SSL does provide a guarantee that the password is 
private during transit, but no more than that. The technical security method 
adopted by the banking industry (and prominently advertised as providing 
90 As to the meaning of "cracker", seen 30, above. 
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security 91 ) actually provides no technical guarantees that the ongm of any 
instructions to the bank is the genuine customer rather than a cracker. While 
the information exchanged in an SSL communication is private and 
uncorrupted, it will be private and uncorrupted regardless of its source. 
2 Bank authentication 
In addition to customer authentication issues, there are also bank authentication 
issues. SSL does provide a mechanism whereby the bank can verify its 
identity - the use of certificates from a certificate authority.92 
Providing a certificate is a necessary precursor to forming a secure SSL 
communication. However, a customer may not notice that a communication 
with the cracker is not secure (through the absence of the padlock or key 
symbol in the browser window). It may even be possible for advanced crackers 
to make a session appear secure by "layering" a picture of a padlock in the 
right place on the screen. 93 This is possible because browser applications 
normally (depending on the user ' s choice of setting) do not prompt users when 
they receive a valid certificate. Nor is there usually any prompt when users do 
not receive any certificate. Therefore there may be nothing observable by a 
customer that confirms whether the communication is secure or not. 
Alternatively, a cracker attempting to masquerade as a legitimate bank could 
send a certificate as part of creating a genuine SSL connection. Certificates are 
issued by certificate authorities, which are private companies. It is conceivable 
that a less reputable certificate authority could issue certificates to crackers 
intent on fraud. 
In this regard, it is worth noting that several banks have begun to advertise how 
SSL and certificates work. One bank, for example, points out that the SSL 
padlock icon should appear and that double-clicking on the icon will show the 
9 1 See, for example, Bank of New Zealand " Internet Banking and Internet Banking for 
Business Security" <http://www.bnz.co.nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
92 See above page 5 and following. 
93 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Phishing". 
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certificate. It also provides instructions of what to look for on the certificate, 
such as the correct URL and the certificate authority.
94 
The certificate process is quite technical and is not likely to be widely 
understood by customers. However, more advanced cracker attacks may fool 
even technology-literate customers. This makes it possible for crackers to fool 
customers into believing a forged website they are viewing is valid. 
B Weaknesses due to Bank Practices 
Ross Anderson is a computer cryptography expert who has appeared as an 
expert witness in several unauthorised transaction cases.
95 Anderson' s "Why 
Cryptosystems Fail"96 is perhaps the seminal article on cryptographic systems 
and security. Although the article considers ATM fraud specifically, it is 
equally applicable to other systems, including online banking. Anderson points 
out a number of technical flaws with ATM security.
97 This demonstrates that 
bank systems are not secure. It is entirely possible similar such flaws exist with 
online banking security. However, there is no evidence either way on this. 
Anderson' s more important conclusion is that most unauthorised transactions 
are not caused by technical attacks, but rather by implementation errors and 
management failures. 98 
I Security of banks ' systems 
There are a number of possible methods to fraudulently obtain user log-ons and 
passwords from bank customers (these are discussed below). From a cracker's 
94 See Superbank "Security Information" <http://www.superbank.co.nz> (last accessed 4 
February 2006). 
95 See the papers associated with Diners Club (SA) Pty limited v Singh, available at 
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/> (last accessed 20 January 2006). See also, for example, John 
Leyden "How to get an ATM PIN in 15 guesses" (21 February 2003) The Register United 
Kingdom <http: //www.theregister.co.uk> (last accessed 20 January 2006). 
96 (University of Cambridge, 1993) <http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/> (last accessed 20 January 2006) 
[" Why Cryptosystems Fail"]. 
97 Anderson "Why Cryptosystems Fail", above n 96, 2-7. See also Mike Bond and Piotr 
Zielinski "Decimalisation table attacks for PIN cracking" (University of Cambridge, 2003) 
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/> (last accessed 20 January 2006). 
98 Anderson "Why Cryptosystems Fail", above n 96, 9 and 12. 
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point-of-view, however, they are inefficient. Customers will only ever know 
their own details. Banks, on the other hand, need to know the details of all their 
customers, including log-ons and passwords. They are therefore a far more 
enticing target, even if this information is protected by bank security systems. 
It appears that no such attacks have occurred in New Zealand. However, 
similar incidents have occurred internationally. For example, companies that 
process credit card data have been targeted. Some high-profile incidents have 
netted millions of customers' details, including credit card numbers.99 
Banks in New Zealand advertise that they operate common practices like 
firewalls. 100 However, the actual level of technical security does not appear to 
have been tested or made public as yet. If the security systems implemented by 
banks are not adequate, customer log-ons and passwords could be stolen by 
crackers. 
Any cracker using a stolen log-on and password would be able to access a 
customer's account. This is because SSL does not provide any guarantee of 
customer authenticity as discussed above. This vulnerability is compounded by 
the fact that customers must always enter the same log-on and password. 
2 Security of bank procedures 
Similarly, Anderson points out a number of flaws among security procedures 
of bank staff and contractors. Even where the procedures themselves are 
adequate, sometimes the execution may be lacking. Anderson outlines a 
number of examples, including cases where security systems were installed 
incorrectly, where bank security staff failed to implement necessary security 
99 See, for example, Jonathan Krim and Michael Barbaro "40 Million Credit Card Numbers 
Hacked" ( I 8 June 2005) The Washington Post Washington DC, USA 
<http: //www.washingtonpost.com> (last accessed 20 January 2006) and Fred Katayama 
"Hacker hits up to 8M credit cards" (27 February 2003) CNNMoney.com United States 
<http://www.cnnmonev.com> (last accessed 20 January 2006). 
100 See, for example, Bank of New Zealand "Internet Banking and Internet Banking for 
Business Security", above n 91. 
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measures, and even where the installers of security systems left themselves a 
"back door" (a hidden way of accessing the system).
101 
Again, such weaknesses may leave banks vulnerable to crackers and even 
fraudulent staff stealing customer log-ons and passwords. Again, online 
banking is susceptible to such attacks as the security measures for confirming 
customer authenticity are limited. 
C Weaknesses to Cracker Attacks 
While it is far more efficient to target banks, customers are often less 
technology and security-literate. There are a number of attacks by which 
crackers may attempt to gain customers' log-ons and passwords. 
I Spoofing and phishing 
"Spoofing" refers to the practice by which one person sends another an email, 
but the email appears to the recipient to be from someone other than the 
sender. 102 "Phishing" is a similar practice, but refers more specifically to 
emails that seek to extract personal information from the recipient, such as 
online banking log-ons and passwords.103 This attack is able to work due to 
weaknesses in the email protocols. It is possible to change the apparent sender 
of an email without detection. 
In the context of online banking, phishing involves a cracker preparing an 
email that appears as if it comes from a legitimate bank email address. The 
email has a message to the effect that the recipient needs to verify their 
customer details. The email suggests that the customer click on a link in the 
email to do this. Clicking on the link takes you to an official-looking website 
with instructions for the customer to enter their log-on and password. The site 
is, of course, not legitimate, but rather serves as a way for the cracker to obtain 
101 Anderson "Why Cryptosystems Fail", above n 96, 2-4 and 9-10. 
102 Wikipedia , above n 27, "Spoofing Attack". 
103 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Phishing". 
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customers' log-ons and passwords. 104 There have been several of this type of 
phishing email sent recently. 105 
Unlike the weaknesses due to bank practices, which are due to weaknesses in 
customer authentication, phishing is possible because of the weaknesses in 
bank authentication. Because customers may not be sure whether the bank 
website they are accessing is genuine, they can be deceived into disclosing 
their log-ons and passwords. 
2 Pharming 
Like phishing, pharming is an attack that is possible due to weaknesses in a 
protocol, this time the "Domain Name System" protocol ("DNS"). The DNS 
protocol is also applicable to other applications such as email, but in the 
context of pharming relates to assigning "URLs". 
106 
Entering a URL into a browser usually involves entering something such as 
http: //www.examplebank.com. The user is then taken to the examplebank.com 
website. However, the "real" address for a website actually consists of a set of 
four numbers between O and 255 , separated by full stops - for example, 
123.45.67.89 (its "IP address"). Linking the easy-to-remember company or 
brand name to its actual IP address is done by DNS servers. 
107 
If a cracker were able to access examplebank.com' s DNS server, he or she 
would be able to reassign its URL to a different IP address that the cracker 
controls. This can be achieved either through technical means ( cracking the 
DNS server's own security measures), or by fooling the DNS server' s staff into 
believing that the cracker has legitimate authority to instruct the URL to be 
reassigned to a different IP address. A customer then entering the URL 
http: //www.examplebank.com would not be directed to the genume 
examplebank.com website, but rather the cracker's website, forged to look like 
104 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Phishing" . 
105 See, for example " Phishing scam continues to hit Westpac" (4 January 2006) National 
Business Review New Zealand <http: //www.nbr.co.nz> (last accessed 20 January 2006). 
106 "Uniform Resource Locator", above n 24. 
107 Wikipedia, above n 27, "Uniform Resource Locator" and "Domain Name System". 
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examplebank.com website. Customers entering their log-ons and passwords to 
the site would actually be sending them to the cracker, who would then be able 
to use them at the genuine exan1plebank.com website to authorise 
transactions. '08 
Pharming is similar to phishing in that customers enter their own log-ons and 
passwords into a forged website. Only the means by which the customer is 
tricked into accessing that forged website differ. Like phishing, the attack is 
possible because of the weaknesses in bank authentication. Customers can 
never be quite sure whether the website they are accessing is the genuine bank 
website. 
Unlike phishing, pharming does not appear to have been used to target online 
banking customers to date. 109 
3 Keystroke logging 
Phishing and pharming attacks rely on deceiving customers. Keystroke 
logging, on the other hand, is a "Trojan". This is a type of malicious 
progran1me that is often spread by means of a virus or by masquerading as a 
different sort of programme (hence the name "Trojan"). When a Trojan is 
downloaded, it installs itself without the knowledge of the user. A keystroke 
logger is a type of Trojan that records all the keystrokes of a user as he or she 
enters them. This can be used to record log-ons and passwords as they are 
typed by a bank customer.' ' 0 The keystroke logger then automatically sends 
information back to the cracker that distributed it. 
Unlike phishing and pharming, keystroke loggers do not exploit vulnerabilities 
in bank authentication. Rather, they exploit the customer authentication 
weaknesses. SSL does not provide any surety as to the actual identity of a 
person entering a log-on and password. The protection it does provide, making 
information private, only comes into play once the information has left a user' s 
108 See Wikipedia, above n 27, " Pharming". 
109 See Wikipedia , above n 27, "Pharming". 
110 Wikipedia , above n 27, " Keystroke Logging" . 
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computer. However, keystroke loggers essentially record information "inside" 
the user's computer, before it is encrypted. This lack of authentication, 
combined with the fact that customers must always enter the same log-on and 
password, make online banking vulnerable to a keystroke logger attack. 
VII SOME AD VICE FOR CUSTOMERS 
The previous section of this paper presented some flaws in the technical 
security measures of online banking. These flaws should allow Gus to mount a 
number of challenges to the validity of the unauthorised transaction as follows. 
A Evidential Matters 
Any of the weaknesses in bank practices described could potentially represent 
a "reasonable explanation for the offender's access to the [password] and the 
explanation does not involve a breach of the conditions of use".
111 This would 
bring Gus within the limited liability clause and recover from his bank the 
unauthorised transaction. However, whether any of these particular flaws exist 
in Gus' case would need to be determined. And, as indicated earlier in this 
paper, the onus is on Gus to prove them. 
Anderson points out that Gus is unlikely to succeed if he is required to bring 
specific evidence that shows the precise flaw in the bank' s security systems or 
practices. Rather, Anderson suggests the best approach for Gus would be to 
demand copies of things such as: 112 
the bank's security and quality documentation, including security policies 
and standards, crypto key management procedures and logs, audit and 
insurance inspectors' reports, test and bug reports ... balancing records and 
logs, and details of all customer complaints in the last seven years. 
To this may be added matters such as whether any attacks have been made 
against the banks security systems, when such attacks were made, whether any 
have succeeded, whether there have been any other security compromises, the 
111 Office of the Banking Ombudsman Case Note Compendium 2001-2002, above n 71, 37. 
11 2 Ross Anderson " Liability and Computer Security: Nine Principles" (University of 
Cambridge, 1994) <http: //www.cl.cam.ac.uk/> (last accessed 20 January 2006), 3 ["Nine 
Principles"]. 
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banks infom1ation technology policy and whether there have been any 
disciplinary actions taken against staff. 
This would enable Gus to determine whether there are any matters relating to 
bank security practices that may give rise to his unauthorised transaction.' 13 
For example, if a successful attack had recently been made against the bank ' s 
system, Gus ' log-on and password may have been stolen. Other complaints or 
discrepancies in balancing records may show that a number of other customers 
have suffered unauthorised transactions too, perhaps indicating more systemic 
problems. This sort of infom1ation may provide a "reasonable explanation" for 
Gus' unauthorised transaction, bringing Gus within the limited liability 
clause. 11 4 
Gus may also be able to take advantage of the no liability clause. This clause 
provides that Gus is not liable for fraud on the part of bank staff or agents. 
Information relating to the bank' s management procedures and disciplinary 
actions against staff may show potential fraudulent actions on the part of the 
bank' s employees. Similarly, the bank' s information technology policy would 
show what procedures are in place to, for example, stop fraudulent staff 
installing keystroke logging software on the computers that banks make 
available in branches to access their own online banking websites. Information 
to this effect could enable Gus to take advantage of the no liability (fraud) 
clause. 
However, Anderson points out that similar questions in the United Kingdom do 
not usually results in banks actually disclosing information. Rather, banks tend 
to refund customers the amounts of the unauthorised transaction without 
further argument. 1 1 5 
It should be noted that this approach may not be available under the Banking 
Ombudsman scheme, Gus' likely first avenue of redress. While the Banking 
11 3 See above page 32. 
11 4 See above page 16. 
11 5 Anderson "Nine Principles", above n 112, 3. 
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Ombudsman does have the power to request that banks provide information, 1 16 
and that information is normally shared with the customer, 117 banks are entitled 
to assert confidentiality 1 18 and the Banking Ombudsman must respect that 
confidentiality.' 19 Gus may therefore have to result to court action. This would 
enable him to take advantage of the much more rigorous discovery 120 and 
inspections processes. 121 Gus is therefore more likely to get the information 
under the discovery process than the Banking Ombudsman scheme. However, 
the expense of a court action is only likely to be justified in the case of 
significant unauthorised transactions. 
B Consumer Protection 
The preceding section discussed how evidence of weaknesses in bank practices 
may allow Gus to recover the amount of the unauthorised transaction. On the 
other hand, weaknesses to cracker attacks may provide Gus with legal 
arguments against the bank under the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993 or the 
Fair Trading Act 1986. 
I Consumer Guarantees Act 
The Consumer Guarantees Act is a maJor component of New Zealand's 
consumer protection regime. The Act applies to all contracts for the acquisition 
of goods and services 122 by a consumer. 123 The Act operates by implying 
11 6 Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of Reference, above n 6, 
art 5. 
11 7 Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of Reference, above n 6, 
art 7. 
11 8 Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of Ref erence, above n 6, 
art 6. 
11 9 Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of Reference, above n 6, 
art 29. 
120 See High Court Rules, rules 293-317 A. While banks may attempt to resist discovery on the 
grounds of confidentiality, it is not likely the court would accept this in totality. The court may, 
for example, order discovery on a limited basis such as to counsel only. This approach 
recognises the growing view that while some documents may be confidential , it may be 
necessary for the other party to have access to the information to pursue its claim - see High 
Court Rules, rules 297 and 307 and McGechan on Procedure (Brookers Limited, Wellington, 
February 2006) HCR307 .17 <http://www.brookers.co.nz> (last accessed 19 February 2006). 
12 1 See High Court Rules, rules 322-323 . 
122 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, long title. 
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certain terms (in the form of guarantees) into contracts relating to the provision 
of goods and services. Among other things, "services" includes facilities that 
are provided under a contract between a bank and customer. 124 The Consumer 
Guarantees Act therefore applies to online banking. It is also not possible to 
contract out of the Consumer Guarantees Act, unless the consumer acquires a 
good or service for business purposes. 125 This would not apply to Gus. 
For the purposes of this paper, the most important guarantee is that of fitness 
for purpose. 126 The service must be of such a nature and quality that it can 
reasonably be expected to achieve the outcome(s) desired by the consumer. 127 
For online banking, this means that the online banking facility (the systems and 
software) must satisfy the reasonable expectations of the customer. Most 
fundamentally, the customer expects the facility to be secure and not to 
facilitate unauthorised transactions. 
Gus would be able to argue that the systems adopted by banks in the provision 
of online banking do not meet this expectation. The key component of online 
banking "security" is SSL. While SSL carries out it functions admirably, those 
functions are limited to privacy and integrity. It provides no guarantee as to 
customer authenticity, and only limited guarantees at best for bank 
authenticity. 128 These limitations are demonstrated in the weaknesses to cracker 
attacks. 129 
Moreover, banks could make their systems more secure by providing greater 
certainty as to authenticity. "Two-factor authentication" is particularly 
noteworthy in this regard. Two-factor authentication relies on a combination of 
mechanisms for identifying a person. Something a person knows (for example, 
a password) is one such mechanism. Other factors may include something a 
123 "Consumers" are retail customers, that is, not business or trade customers - Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993, s 2. 
124 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s 2. 
125 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s 43. 
126 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s 29. 
127 Laws of New Zealand (Service 36, LexisNexis NZ Limited, September 2005) Consumer 
Protection para 28 <http://www.lexisnexis.co.nz> (last accessed l O January 2006). 
128 See above page 30 and following. 
129 See above page 34 and following. 
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person has (for example, an EFTPOS card) or something a person is (for 
example, biometric identification). For banking, the most common form of 
two-factor authentication adopted to date utilises a device that generates a 
number when the customer presses a button. In addition to the customer's log-
on and password, the code generated by the device must be entered to log on to 
online banking or authorise transactions. The code changes each time the 
button is pressed, and is only valid for a short period of time. As the device 
code is different for every log-on, crackers cannot use recorded information to 
access a customer's online banking. This protects against the phishing, 
pharming and keystroke logging attacks described above. This is an example of 
two-factor authentication utilising something the customer knows (his or her 
password) and something the customer has (the device). 
It is becoming standard banking industry practice internationally to utilise two 
factor authentication. In particular, United States banks will be required to 
strengthen their security measures beyond single-factor authentication by the 
end of 2006 (although the exact method of this strengthening is not 
prescribed). 130 Two New Zealand banks have already adopted two-factor 
authentication using the devices described above. 131 Banks that have not may 
be more vulnerable to challenges that their online banking service is not fit for 
purpose. 
Similarly, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision132 has published Risk 
management principles for electronic banking. 133 The Basel Committee 
principles are accepted practice in the banking industry and are usually adopted 
by domestic prudential supervisors as part of the regulatory framework for 
13° Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Authentication in an Internet Banking 
Environment (Washington DC, USA, 2005). Available at <http: //www.ffiec.gov> (last 
accessed 4 February 2006). This technically has the status of "guidance" only, but will likely 
be adopted by all United States banks. 
131 ASB Bank Limited, above n 18, and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
Limited, above n 20. 
132 The primary standard-setting body for banking supervision - see Bank for International 
Settlements "About the Basel Committee" <http: //www.bis.org> (last accessed 23 January 
2006). 
133 (Basel, Switzerland, 2003). Available at <hrtp://www.bis.org> (last accessed 23 January 
2006) [Basel Committee Electronic Banking Principles]. 
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banks subject to their supervision. 134 While the electronic banking principles 
are specifically put forward as guidance only and not definitive 
requirements, 135 they nevertheless provide some valuable assistance to 
detern1ine good banking practice. In particular, the electronic banking 
· · l 136 pnnc1p es state: 
... e-banking .. . needs special management attention because of the enhanced 
security challenges posed by e-banking. This should include establishing 
appropriate authorisation privileges and authentication measures, logical and 
physical access controls, adequate infrastructure security to maintain 
appropriate boundaries and restrictions on both internal and external user 
activities and data integrity of transactions, records and in formation ... 
While not binding, and only general in nature, failure to meet the accepted 
banking industry practice as embodied in the Basel Committee principles may 
again indicate that the on.line banking services provided are not fit for purpose. 
The weaknesses of (most) New Zealand banks existing systems to cracker 
attacks, and failure to implement readily-available and internationally-accepted 
additional security measures leave those banks open to challenges that their 
measures to ensure authenticity are not sufficient. Given authenticity is a key 
component of the PAIN risks, it would certainly be open to argue that the 
current systems for on.line banking are not "fit for purpose". 
If online banking is not fit for purpose, Gus is entitled to claim damages from 
the bank for any loss that resulted from this shortcoming that was reasonably 
foreseeable. 137 This would include loss suffered due to unauthorised 
transactions. Alternatively, if the breach were deemed "substantial" , 138 Gus 
would be entitled to cancel the contract for the provision of on.line banking 
services. Setting aside those terms would mean that the mandate clause (which 
gives the bank authority to debit Gus' account) did not apply and that Gus' 
bank debited his account without authority. In turn, this means that the bank's 
134 See, for example, Reserve Bank of New Zealand " Implementation of Basel II capital rules 
in New Zealand" (18 March 2005) Press Release <http://www.rbnz.govt.nz> (last accessed 23 
January 2006). 
135 Basel Committee Electronic Banking Principles, above n 133, l. 
136 Basel Committee Electronic Banking Principles, above n 133, 2 . 
137 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s 32(c). 
138 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, ss 32 and 36. 
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debt to Gus would still exist and the bank would need to re-credit Gus' 
account. However, both damages and cancelling the contract would result in 
the same outcome. 
The Consumer Guarantees Act also provides a guarantee that services will be 
carried out with reasonable care and skill. 
139 In the same manner as the 
guarantee of fit for purpose, Gus may be able to argue that banks are not 
providing online banking with reasonable care and skill. The "reasonable 
bank" may adopt, for example, two-factor authentication so as to address the 
concerns with current online banking systems as described above. 
2 Fair Trading Act 
The Consumer Guarantees Act covers agreements for services that have 
already been concluded. This contrasts with the Fair Trading Act, which covers 
the pre-contract period. In particular, the Fair Trading Act prohibits businesses 
from engaging in false and misleading conduct in advertising their goods. For 
the purposes of this paper, this includes conduct that may mislead customers as 
to the nature, characteristics or suitability of purpose of a particular service.
140 
It also includes false and misleading representations that services are of a 
particular kind, standard, or quality.
141 
Banks advertise their systems as secure and refer to the benefits of SSL.
142 
However, this could amount to misleading conduct, given the weaknesses to 
cracker attacks described above. This may provide grounds for Gus to take 
action under the Fair Trading Act. Breach of the Fair Trading Act can result in 
both criminal 143 and civil 
144 action. For Gus this includes the possibility of 
actions for damages for loss suffered, 
145 or cancellation of the contract. 
146 Like 
139 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, s 28. 
14° Fair Trading Act 1986, s I I. 
141 Fair Trading Act 1986, s I 3(b). 
142 See, for example, ASB Bank "Precautions we take" <http: //www.asb.co.nz> (last accessed 
4 February 2006) and Bank of New Zealand "Internet Banking and Internet Banking for 
Business Security", above n 91. 
143 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 40. 
144 Fair Trading Act I 986, ss 41-46. 
145 Fair Trading Act I 986, s 43(2)(d). 
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the Consumer Guarantees Act, both of these would result m Gus being 
refunded the amount of the unauthorised transaction. 
In addition to the courts, the Banking Ombudsman may be able to apply the 
provisions of the Consumer Guarantees Act and Fair Trading Act. The Banking 
Ombudsman may apply "any applicable rule of law or relevant judicial 
authority" when considering complaints. 147 Depending on the amount of the 
claim, Gus would also be able to take his complaint to the Disputes Tribunal. 148 
C No Liability for Faults in the Online System 
The no liability (error) clause provides that Gus 1s not liable where the 
unauthorised transaction is the result of faults or errors that occur in the online 
banking system. The other category of weaknesses, cracker attacks, may allow 
Gus to argue that this clause applies. Gus would, however, need to show that 
the weaknesses are of such a scale that they amount to fundamental faults or 
errors with the online system. This would be an interesting argument, but there 
does not appear to be any guidance that assists in determining this question. 
Even if he could prove that the weaknesses amounted to faults , Gus would also 
need to show that the faults do not fall within the proviso to the no liability 
( error) clause - that is that the errors are not obvious or previously notified by 
the barik. 149 Some banks are starting to advertise extra steps a customer can 
take to ensure the authenticity of the barik website. 150 
However, United States precedent may help Gus here. In a case involving 
A TM fraud, it was held that a barik, having knowledge of a specific type of 
fraud, is negligent if it does not provide sufficient information to warn its 
customers of that type of fraud and how to take precautions to guard against it. 
Moreover, this burden is not discharged by publishing general warning notices 
146 
Fair Trading Act 1986, s 43(2)(a). 
147 Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of Ref erence, above n 6, 
art I 6(a). 
148 Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s I 0(2) and Schedule l Part 2, Consumer Guarantees Act 
1993, ss 39 and 47 and Fair Trading Act 1986 ss 39 and 43 . 149 See above page 16. 
150 See Superbank "Security Information" above n 94. 
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to the effect of "Beware of A TM fraud" or "Do not let your card be used for 
any transaction but your own". 151 If this were to be followed in New Zealand, 
general warnings of the type currently published would not be sufficient. 
On the other hand, some sorts of cracker attack have received specific security 
warnings from banks. In particular, the recent spate of phishing attacks has 
resulted in action by the banking industry, at least in some places. 152 Such a 
warning would preclude any arguments that the no liability (error) clause 
should apply in respect of weaknesses in online banking systems to cracker 
attacks. 
This argument could potentially be made before the Banking Ombudsman. 
However, if specific non-public evidence is required, Gus may be required to 
resort to the court so as to take advantage of the discovery process. 153 
D Tai Hing/ Public Policy 
Finally, Gus would be able to ask the court 154 to set aside the terms of the 
contract on the basis of Tai Hing or general public policy grounds. The Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Tai Hing stated: 155 
If banks wish to impose upon their customers an express obligation ... the 
burden ... must be brought home to the customer. .. this [is an] undoubtedly 
rigorous test. The test is rigorous because the bankers would have their terms 
of business so construed as to exclude the rights which the customer would 
enjoy if they were not excluded by express agreement... Clear and 
unambiguous provision is needed . . . 
It would be possible to argue that Gus' bank had not met the "rigorous test" of 
"bringing home" the effect of the express terms to Gus. While their Lordships 
15 1 Ognibene v Citibank (1981) 112 Misc 2d 219, 223 ; (1981) 446 NYS 2d 845, 848; [1981] 
NY Misc LEXIS 3417, 9-10 (Civil Court of the City ofNew York, New York County) Mara T 
Thorpe J. 
152 See Westpac Banking Corporation " Latest hoax email scam" <http://www.westpac.com.au> 
(last accessed 23 January 2006). Note however, that this is the website of the Australian 
division of Westpac. 
153 See above n 120, and accompanying text. 
154 The Banking Ombudsman or the Disputes Tribunal may also be able to apply public policy 
concerns (see Banking Ombudsman of New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Terms of 
Reference, above n 6, art 16(a) and Disputes Tribunals Act 1988, s 19(1)(e)). However 
reasoning on the basis of public policy will have more authority coming from the court. 
155 Tai Hing, above n 45, 110 Lord Scarman for their Lordships. 
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were concerned with the obligation to check bank statements, it seems the 
reasoning could be extended to apply to online banking. The net practical 
effect of the terms is to shift essential elements of the burden of proof from the 
bank on to the customer. This effect is not apparent on the face of the express 
d . b . d 1 l 156 tern1s, nor oes 1t appear to e commurncate anyw 1ere e se. 
VIII SOME ADVICE FOR BANKS 
In its advice to customers, this paper presented a number of possible arguments 
that may be available to a customer who has been the victim of unauthorised 
transactions. However, as pointed out by Armstrong, some of these arguments 
are open to fraudulent as well as legitimate customers. 157 It would therefore be 
in the interests of banks, as well as customers, for banks to revise the express 
terms, systems and practices relating to online banking. This may include both 
legal and technical matters. There is a review of the Code of Banking Practice 
1'8 underway at the moment. ) 
This paper compares New Zealand ' s online banking regime with that of several 
international jurisdictions. All reveal slightly different approaches. This paper 
attempts go outline these various approaches, before making some suggestions 
about a revised legal regime for online banking. It also makes some technical 
suggestions that banks could consider. 
A The United Kingdom 
I Banking Code 
The approach in the United Kingdom is similar to that in New Zealand. There 
is no legislative framework governing the contractual arrangements between 
156 One United Kingdom commentator has suggested that the equivalent contractual terms in 
the United Kingdom could be subject to scrutiny under the Unfair Terms in Consumer 
Contracts Regulations 1999 - see Ahmad Azzouni "Internet Banking and the Law: A Critical 
Examination of the Legal Controls over Internet Banking in the UK and their Ability to Frame, 
Regulate and Secure Banking on the Net" (2003) 18 JIBLR 351. Although New Zealand does 
not have an equivalent statutory regime, the same effect could be achieved under public policy 
grounds. 
157 Armstrong "Nine Principles", above n 112, 4. 
158 New Zealand Bankers ' Association "Review of the Code of Banking Practice" 
<http://\\n,:vw.nzba.org. nz> (last accessed 4 February 2006). 
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banks and their customers for the provision of banking services. Rather, the 
bank-customer relationship is left to the express terms and conditions 
associated with particular banking products. However, like New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom has a voluntary self-regulatory Banking Code 159 providing 
guidance to banks as to the terms and conditions they should adopt for 
provisions relating to the use of online banking. 
2 Mandate 
Like New Zealand, the mandate clause is not covered in the United Kingdom 
Banking Code. Rather, banks presume that an online transaction initiated by a 
customer' s correct log-on and password is authorised.160 
3 Liability and security 
The United Kingdom also limits liability for unauthorised transactions. The 
Banking Code provides that customer liability is limited to £50 for any 
unauthorised transactions prior to notification, so long as the customer has not 
acted fraudulently or not taken reasonable care (discussed below). 161 However, 
not all United Kingdom banks appear to have adopted the £50 limited liability 
clause for unauthorised online transactions. Some banks actually accept the 
entire risk for unauthorised online transactions (that is, customer liability 1s 
limited to £0) where there is no fraud or negligence. 162 
159 British Bankers ' Association , the Building Societies Association and the Association for 
Payment Clearing Services The Banking Code (London, United Kingdom, 2003). Available at 
<http: //www.bankin gcode.org.uk> (last accessed 4 February 2006) [ United Kingdom Banking 
Code]. 
160 See, for example, Royal Bank of Scotland "Direct and Digital Banking Services: Terms and 
Conditions" <http://www.rbs. co. uk> (last accessed 14 January 2006), cl I and Hongkong and 
Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited "Internet Banking Terms and Conditions" 
<http: //www. hsbc .co. uk> (last accessed 14 January 2006), cls 3.1-3.3. 
16 1 United Kingdom Banking Code, above n 159, cl 12. 10. 
162 See, for example, Royal Bank of Scotland "Direct and Digital Banking Services: Terms and 
Conditions", above n 160, cl 6 and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited 
" Internet Banking Terms and Conditions", above n I 60, cl 4.1. See also Nicholas Bohrn, Ian 
Brown and Brian Gladman " Electronic Commerce: Who Carries the Risk of Fraud?" 2000(3) 
Journal of Information, Law and Technology, part 4.2. Available at the University of 
Warwick ' s Electronic Law Journals project <http: //www2 .warwick.ac.uk> (last accessed 14 
January 2006). 
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The United Kingdom Banking Code also provides that the limited liability 
clause does not apply where customers have acted fraudulently or have not 
taken reasonable care. 163 Lack of reasonable care may include breach of the 
password clause. Again like New Zealand, the password clause includes 
requirements to keep passwords confidential, not write passwords down and 
h · d 164 c oose appropnate passwor s. 
This is somewhat more favourable to the customer than the New Zealand 
approach. New Zealand also excludes limited liability where customers are 
generally fraudulent or negligent, as well as where they have breached the 
password clause. 165 It would appear that any breach of the password clause in 
New Zealand would exclude the limited liability clause.
166 However, by tying 
breach of the password clause to negligence, it would seem that a United 
Kingdom customer would have to unreasonably breach the password clause. 
This may allow, for example, a customer to write down his or her password, so 
long as he or she takes reasonable care in doing so. Reasonable care may 
include, for example, making reasonable efforts to disguise the password, or 
keeping it physically secure such as locked in a safe and/or away from a 
computer. 167 
.f. Presumptions and the burden of proof 
Very differently to New Zealand, the United Kingdom does not appear to place 
the burden of proof regarding unauthorised transactions on the customer. The 
current version of the United Kingdom Banking Code states "Unless we [the 
bank] can show that you [the customer] have acted fraudulently or without 
reasonable care, your liability for the misuse of your card will be limited as 
163 United Kingdom Banking Code, above n 159, cl 12.9. See also, for example, Royal Bank of 
Scotland "Direct and Digital Banking Services: Terms and Conditions", above n 160, cls 3-7 
and Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited " Internet Banking Terms and 
Conditions", above n 160, cls 2.1-2.3 and 4 .2. 
164 United Kingdom Banking Code, above n 159, cl 12.5. 
165 New Zealand Code of Banking Practice, above n 51, cl 3.9(d). See also page 15, above. 
166 See above page 24. 
167 Note, however, that Bohm, above n 162 and Azzouni , above n 156, argue that customers 
face potentially unlimited liability due to the mandate clause. However, this argument appears 
to have been made without reference to the qualifications provided by the liability clause. 
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follows ... [emphasis addedj" . 
168 This is the reverse of the New Zealand 
situation, where the presumption is that the customer breached the password 
clause unless the customer is able to prove otherwise. 
However, it should also be noted that while some banks seem to adopt this 
approach, others do not. These banks require the customer to prove absence of 
fault and negligence. 169 
Anderson, however, dismisses this as a "cosmetic change" to the previous 
situation,170 which seems to have been more akin to the current New Zealand 
approach. There do not appear to be any recent United Kingdom cases which 
would directly address this issue. There is, however, an online forum whereby 
customers can complain of unauthorised withdrawals from their accounts. 
171 
Although this online forum cannot be considered definitive, there are a number 
of recently-reported instances where banks have sought to rely on a 
presumption of authorisation and/or fault where the correct password or PIN is 
used. 172 On the other hand, there are some instances where banks have 
refunded customers upon receiving a complaint regarding an unauthorised 
withdrawal, 173 although some with difficulty. 
174 
168 United Kingdom Banking Code, above n 159, cl 12.10. See also Azzouni, above n 156, 359-
360 and Bohm, above n 162, part 4.2 . 
169 Contrast Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited "Internet Banking Terms 
and Conditions", above n 160, cl 4.3 (however note that cl 4.2 is more vague) with Royal Bank 
of Scotland " Direct and Digital Banking Services: Terms and Conditions", above n 160, cl 7. 
170 Anderson "Nine Principles", above n 112, 7. 
17 1 Mike Bond "Phantom Withdrawals: on-line resources for victims of ATM fraud" 
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk> (last accessed 20 January 2006). 
172 See, for example, Bond " Phantom Withdrawals: on-line resources for victims of A TM 
fraud" , above n 171 , "Camm Case" (Case Number 17, 24 October 2004) and "Sexton Case" 
(Case Number 21 , 25 October 2005). 
173 See, for example, Bond "Phantom Withdrawals: on-line resources for victims of A TM 
fraud", above n 171 , " Hardy Case" (Case Number 16, 17 December 2004). 
174 See, for example, Bond "Phantom Withdrawals: on-line resources for victims of A TM 
fraud", above n 171 , "Anon 1 Case" (Case Number 12, 14 May 2004) and "Bolton Case" (Case 
Number 14, 17 October2004). 
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B Australia 
1 EFT Code 
Like the United Kingdom and New Zealand, Australia also operates a non-
statutory scheme for governing the bank-customer relationship. However, 
unlike the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the Australian scheme is not 
wholly self-regulatory. Instead, the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission ("ASIC") 175 established an Electronic Funds Transfer Working 
Group. The Working Group produced an Electronic Funds Transfer Code of 
Conduct (the "EFT Code"). 176 Choosing to participate in the scheme is 
voluntary for financial institutions, but once a financial institution has opted to 
participate, it must comply with the requirements of the EFT Code. 
2 Mandate 
Mandate is not covered by the EFT Code. However, perhaps unsurprisingly 
given the Australian domination of the New Zealand banking environment, the 
mandate clauses adopted by Australian banks follow the same model adopted 
by their New Zealand counterparts. Once again, a correct log-on and password 
are deemed sufficient mandate. 177 
175 ASIC is the Australian regulatory body for financial services and markets, companies, and 
consumer protection in superannuation, insurance, deposit taking and credit. See the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 and <http: //www.asic.gov.au> (last accessed 
15 January 2006). See also ASIC's consumer protection website, 
<http://www.fido .asic.gov.au> (last accessed 15 January 2006). 
176 ASIC Electronic Funds Transfer Code of Conduct (Canberra ACT, Australia, 2002). 
Available at <http://www.fido.asic.gov.au> (last accessed 15 January 2006) [Australian EFT 
Code]. 
177 See, for example, Westpac Banking Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet 
Banking and BPA Y" <http://www.westpac.com.au> (last accessed 23 January 2006), cls 6 and 
7 and National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement 
including Terms and Conditions" <http: //www.national.com.au> (last accessed 15 January 
2006), cl 21. 
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3 Liability 
Like New Zealand, the EFT Code provides for a range of situations where the 
customer will not be liable for any unauthorised transactions. 178 These 
situations include, for example, where the bank ' s agents or employees have 
acted fraudulently 179 or where the unauthorised transaction occurs after the 
customer has notified the bank of the loss of his or her password. 180 
The EFT Code also provides for a limited liability clause. Where the no 
liability clause does not apply, a customer will be liable for, at most, A$150.181 
Similar to the United Kingdom and New Zealand, this limited liability will not 
apply where the customer has acted fraudulently or failed to comply with the 
required security measures. 182 
4 Security 
The required Australian security measures are less onerous on customers than 
the equivalent United Kingdom and New Zealand requirements. An Australian 
customer will not be liable for security breaches unless he or she has acted with 
178 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cls 5.2-5.4. See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPAY", above n 177, cl 10 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27.1. 
179 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.2(a). See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPAY", above n 177, cl 10 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27.1 (a). 
180 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.3. See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPAY", above n 177, cl 10 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27. l(e) . 
18 1 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.5(c). See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPAY", above n 177, cl 12 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27 .2( c )(i). 
182 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.5(a). See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPAY", above n 177, cl 11 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cls 27.2(a) and 27.3. 
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"extreme carelessness" in failing to protect his or her security measures (such 
as passwords). 183 "Extreme carelessness" is defined as: 184 
a degree of carelessness with the security of the codes which greatly exceeds 
what would normally be considered careless behaviour. For example storing 
the user' s username and password for Internet banking in a diary or personal 
organiser or computer (not locked with a PIN) under the heading "Internet 
banking codes" . 
Also less onerously, Australia does not prohibit keeping written records of 
passwords. The EFT Code only requires that reasonable attempts are made to 
protect the security of the record. 185 This may include making reasonable 
efforts to disguise the password or keeping passwords physically secure. 186 
An Australian customer will also be liable if he or she has "voluntarily" 
. 187 disclosed a password or chosen an inappropriate password (such as the 
customer' s name or date of birth). 188 
5 Presumptions and the burden of proof 
The Australian approach regarding presumptions and the burden of proof is 
also more favourable to the customer than the New Zealand approach. Like the 
United Kingdom, Australia requires the bank to show that the customer was 
183 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.6(e). See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPAY", above n 177, cl 11 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27.3(a)(ii) . 
184 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.6(e) and endnote 17. 
185 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.6(c). See also Australian EFT Code, cl 5.6(b) and 
also, for example, Westpac Banking Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking 
and BPA Y" , above n 177, cl 8 and National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking 
Product Disclosure Statement including Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27.3(a)(iii). 
186 For some examples of what one bank considers do not amount to " reasonable efforts", see 
Westpac Banking Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPA Y", above 
n 177, cl 8. 
187 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.6(a). See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPA Y", above n 177, cl 8 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27 .3(a)(i). 
188 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.6(d). See also, for example, Westpac Banking 
Corporation "Terms and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPA Y", above n 177, cl 8 and 
National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure Statement including 
Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27.3(b). 
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negligent or failed to comply with the security requirements. 189 However, in 
terms of evidence, the EFT Code provides that "all reasonable evidence must 
be considered, including all reasonable explanations for the transactions 
occurring."
190 Requirements for "reasonable explanations for the transactions 
occurring" may shift the balance somewhat back towards the bank, as it would 
appear to exclude more far-fetched customer explanations. Banks would not 
have to rebut such explanations. 
However, perhaps most significantly, the EFT Code states: 19 1 
The fact that the account has been accessed with the co1Tect [password] while 
significant, will not of itself constitute proof on the balance of probability 
that the [customer] has contributed to losses through the [customer' s] fraud 
or through the [customer] contravening the [security requirements or 
password clause]. 
This means that banks are not allowed to maintain the fault presumption - that 
customers must be responsible for transactions, merely because the technology 
is secure. This provides a significant advantage for Australian customers 
compared to their New Zealand counterparts. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to test this theoretical position by application 
to decided cases in Australia. No cases appear to have been decided. Further, 
the EFT Code provides for private external dispute resolution schemes. 192 It 
does not appear that such schemes publish decisions in a readily-available 
format. 
189 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.5(a). See also Australian EFT Code cl 5.5(b) and, 
for example, National Australia Bank "National Internet Banking Product Disclosure 
Statement including Terms and Conditions", above n 177, cl 27.2(b). However note that 
Westpac is more vague as to the required standard - see Westpac Banking Corporation "Terms 
and Conditions for Internet Banking and BPA Y" , above n 177, cl l 0. 
190 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.5. 
19 1 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl 5.5. 
192 Australian EFT Code, above n 176, cl I 0.8 and following. 
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C The United States 
1 Electronic Fund Transfer Act 
Unlike the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, the United States has 
implemented statutory rules governing the relationship between banks and their 
customers. The Electronic Fund Transfer Act 1982 193 was enacted in response 
to concerns that electronic funds transfers were such that the rights and 
liabilities of customers (particularly) and banks were unclear. 194 The Act 
applies to all transactions "initiated through an electronic terminal, telephonic 
. . ,, 195 mstrument or computer or magnetic tape . 
2 Mandate 
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act provides that a customer is not liable for an 
electronic transaction, other than a transaction that has been initiated by a card, 
code or other means of access that can be identified as relating to that 
customer. 196 The Act does not provide guidance as to what does amount to 
mandate. Rather, it means that a bank cannot construe mandate from a means 
of access that does not identify the individual customer. 
Instead, as for the other jurisdictions considered, mandate for online banking is 
covered by the contractual terms and conditions agreed between banks and 
customers. The general approach once again seems to be that logging in with 
the correct password amounts to mandate. 197 
3 Authorisation 
Unlike the other jurisdictions considered in this paper, the Electronic Fund 
Transfer Act does not provide that a customer will face liability if he or she 
failed to observe some security provisions or satisfy a reasonable person 
193 15 USC§ 1693. 
194 15 USC§ 1693 Congressional findings and declaration of purpose. 
195 15 USC§ 1693a(6). 
196 15 USC§ 1693g(a) and 1693g(e). 
197 
See, for example, Wells Fargo "Online Access Agreement for Wells Fargo Online and 
Wells Fargo Business Online Services" <http: //www.wellsfargo .com> (last accessed 15 
January 2006), cl X. 
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standard. Instead, the Act focuses on the concept of an "unauthorised" 
transaction. If a transaction is authorised, the customer is fully liable. If it is 
unauthorised, the customer is able to take advantage of the limited liability 
provision discussed below. 
An unauthorised transaction 1s defined as a "transfer from a [customer' s] 
account initiated by a person other than the [customer] without actual authority 
to initiate such transfer and from which the [customer] receives no benefit".198 
The definition goes on to exclude fraudulent transactions 199 and transactions 
where the customer has "furnished" his or her password to another person. 200 
The meaning of "furnished" has been considered in some early cases relating to 
ATM withdrawals. These cases specifically considered whether a customer 
who was tricked into disclosing his or her PIN to a fraudster has "furnished" it. 
It would appear that being unwittingly tricked into disclosing a PIN does not 
amount to "furnishing", even where customers were warned (although perhaps 
not obviously) to be careful with their PIN numbers.20 1 
4 Liability 
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act creates a tiered limited liability regime for 
unauthorised transactions based on the time it takes a customer to notify his or 
her bank. A customer' s liability is limited to US$50 if he or she reports an 
unauthorised transaction within two business days of first noticing the 
unauthorised transaction. This rises to US$500 if the customer delays more 
than two business days but still reports the unauthorised transaction within 
sixty days of receiving his or her periodic account statement. After sixty days, 
198 15 USC § l 693a(l l ). 
199 15 USC § l 693a( 11 )(8). 
200 15 USC§ 1693a(l l)(A). 
20 1 Ognibene v Citibank, above n 151 . This contrasts with the position prior to the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act - see Feldman v Citibank (I 98 I) 110 Misc 2d 838; (I 981) 443 NYS 2d 43 ; 
[1981] NY Misc LEXIS 3172 (Civil Court of City ofNew York, Queens County, NY, USA), 
where the plaintiff was not able to recover in an identical scam to Ognibene. See also Jeff 
Sovern "The Jewel of their Souls: Preventing Identity Theft through Loss Allocation Rules" 
(2003) 64 U Pitt L Rev 343 , 376 and footnote 128. 
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the customer is liable for the entire amount of the unauthorised transaction.202 
Provision is made for the time limits to be extended in extenuating 
. h 1 h . 1· . ?OJ circumstances sue as trave or osp1ta 1sation.-
5 Security 
In quite a different approach from the other jurisdictions considered in this 
paper, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act provides that customers have no 
liability for any unauthorised transactions,204 other than the $50/$500 discussed 
above. It does not appear as though there is any particular standard of care 
required of the customer. 
Provided that the transaction was unauthorised, and reported to the bank within 
the statutory timeframes, even negligent customers would not be liable for any 
unauthorised transactions, other than the relevant limited liability amount 
depending on the delay in reporting the transaction.205 
6 Presumptions and the burden of proof 
The United States provides the clearest rules about the burden of proof. The 
customer has the initial "burden of going forward" to detect and report 
unauthorised transactions. 206 However, once that burden is discharged, the 
bank is solely responsible for showing that the transaction was authorised.207 I{ 
they are unable to do so, the bank must refund the customer the amount of the 
unauthorised transaction, less the $50/$500 statutory limit. 
202 Subject to some causation matters that are beyond the scope of this paper - see 15 USC § 
1693g(a). 
203 15 USC § 1693g(a). See also, for example, Wells Fargo "Online Access Agreement for 
Wells Fargo Online and Wells Fargo Business Online Services", above n 197, cl IX(B). 
204 15 USC§ 1693g(e). 
205 Clayton P Gillette "Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems" (1996) 82 Va L 
Rev 181, 183 and footnote 7. 
206 15 USC§ 1693g(a) and Ognibene v Citibank, above n 151,222 Mara T Thorpe J. See also 
"ATM Crime: Expanding the Judicial Approach to a Bank's Liability for Third Party Crimes 
against ATM Patrons" (1995) 30 Val UL Rev 99, 111-112 and footnote 69. 
207 15 USC§ 1693g(b). 
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General United States case law also reflects this position. The case of Judd v 
Citibank2°
8 was decided before the Electronic Fund Transfer Act came into 
force. However, the result would have been the same following the passage of 
the Act. The case also provides some interesting guidance about witness 
evidence and the reliability of machine or computer evidence. The Court 
essentially held that computer evidence cannot be considered conclusive in and 
of itself. The opposing evidence of a credible witness must be given due 
weight.
209 The Court held that to do otherwise would be to subject the customer 
to an "unmeetable burden of proof'.210 
D The Jurisdictions Compared 
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States have 
adopted different approaches towards regulating online banking.2 11 The United 
States offers the most favourable terms to the customer (and correspondingly, 
least favourable to the bank), followed in order by Australia and the United 
Kingdom, with New Zealand the least favourable. 
It is perhaps a sign of the interests involved that the two jurisdictions with 
entirely self-regulatory approaches (New Zealand and the United Kingdom) 
provide banks the most comfort, while the two jurisdictions that have seen 
government intervention (Australia and the United States) are more customer-
centric. However, this customer-focus has not prevented the expansion of 
online banking in those jurisdictions. In fact, as Anderson points out, that while 
United States banks inevitably pay out a certain amount due to customer 
complaints that are fraudulent, it is not substantial.212 This is reflected in an 
208 (1980) 107 Misc 2d 526 ; (1980) 435 NYS 2d 210; [1980] NY Misc. LEXIS 2882 (Civil 
Court of the City of New York, Queens County, NY, USA). 
209 Judd v Citibank, above n 208, 527-528 John Marmarellis J. 
2 10 Juddv Citibank, above n 208, 529 John Marmarellis J. 
2 11 Appendix 2 to this paper sets out a tabular comparison of the regimes of New Zealand, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and the United States. See page Ill , below. 
2 12 Anderson "Nine Principles", above n 112, 6. However, note this paper was written in 1994 
and the amounts quoted are now out-of-date. 
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early United States case considering unauthorised electronic transactions. 
There the Judge stated: 213 
... the court is not unmindful of the possibility of fraudulent suits. However, 
this fear exists in many areas of the law and the history of jurisprudence has 
not indicated that courts have been unable to competently (although certainly 
not perfectly) deal with such challenges. 
Moreover, Anderson states that United Kingdom banks pay substantially more 
on security measures than their United States counterparts. 214 This is 
presumably to provide better security in an attempt to ensure the mandate and 
fault presumptions apply. Given the similarities of the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand approaches, similar conclusions could be drawn for New 
Zealand. 
E Some Legal Conclusions 
We can therefore conclude that lessening some of the burden on the customer 
would not spell the end of online banking. Such a readjustment in the current 
review of the Code of Banking Practice215 may therefore be appropriate. This 
would also pre-empt the possibility that Parliament may decide to enact more 
extreme legislative measures, as happened in the United States. 
While the exact distribution of bank and customer rights and obligations will 
always be open to debate, this paper considers that one measure in particular 
should be adopted in New Zealand: merging the provisos to the limited liability 
clause (negligence and breach of password clause), so that a customer must 
unreasonably breach the password clause before being held liable. Only 
holding customers liable for such "blameworthy breaches" is the approach of 
the United Kingdom and Australia. This approach would be fairer to customers, 
in that technical breaches216 would not attract liability unless it was proved the 
breach led to the loss. However, perhaps more importantly, it would potentially 
213 Porter v Citibank (1984) 123 Misc 2d 28, 30; 472 NYS 2d 582,583; 1984 NY Misc LEXIS 
2961, 6 (Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, NY, USA) Edward H Lehner 
J. 
214 Anderson "Nine Principles", above n 112, 6. 
215 New Zealand Bankers' Association "Review of the Code of Banking Practice", above n 
158. 
216 See, for example, the case of Mr and Mrs S, above n 83, and accompanying text. 
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allow for greater practical security, assisting both banks and customers. There 
are many sorts of services (both online and offline) that require passwords or 
identification codes. The advice offered to customers by many of these service-
providers is not to choose a password that the customer uses elsewhere. 
Similarly, many instruct customers not to write down the password.2 17 Yet it is 
impossible for customers to remember such a wide array of unique passwords, 
particularly if the service or password is not used often. Customers are 
therefore always likely to write passwords dowrI, use the same password on 
less-secure websites or pick easy-to-guess passwords. This paper suggests that 
bariks would attract greater security by instructing customers on suitable ways 
to disguise written passwords so that they cannot be deciphered readily. 
However, New Zealand banks cannot provide this advice in light of their 
current express terms. To do so would encourage customers to breach the 
password clause. 
As a secondary measure, one favouring customers, bariks should assume the 
burden to prove that a customer breached the terms, rather than shifting the 
burden on to the customer to prove that he or she did not. This would provide a 
fairer approach, in that the burden would be placed on that best-placed to bear 
it. Banks have far more resources to investigate complaints than customers. In 
the event that both parties are innocent, bariks are also much-better placed to 
bear any loss. It would also incentivise bariks to do everything (economically) 
possible to reduce the risk of unauthorised transactions in online bariking. 
These two measures would make New Zealand' s online bariking provisions 
very similar to Australia's. Generally, this paper considers that the Australian 
model provides a good starting point for the current review of the Code of 
Bariking Practice. It seems to provide an appropriate balance between the 
interests of bariks and customers. It would also be easy to implement, given the 
Australian-dominance of the New Zealand bariking industry and their existing 
experience with the EFT Code. 
2 17 See the password clause, above page 18. 
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F Technical Measures 
This paper also considers that New Zealand banks should increase the rigour of 
their technical security measures. This paper' s analysis of SSL, banks primary 
security mechanism, shows its weaknesses. These are due to a 
misunderstanding as to SSL's purpose. It is not designed to provide any 
guarantee as to customer authenticity. Additional security measures keyed to 
individual customers would provide far greater certainty as to customer 
authenticity. 
Such measures may include biometric measures such as retina scans, thumb 
prints or voice recognition.218 Perhaps more likely in the near future, the two-
factor authentication devices219 adopted by some banks should be adopted by 
those that have not yet done so. Even more low-tech would be to adopt 
Transaction Authentication Numbers ("TANs").
220 TANs essentially consist of 
a sheet of paper containing numerous codes. Each time a customer wishes to 
log on to online banking, a TAN must be entered. Once that TAN is used, the 
customer crosses it off the list and cannot use it again. Once all the numbers are 
used, the customer must go into his or her bank and collect another sheet. 
Again, this provides two-factor authentication, as the customer must both know 
something (the password) and have something (the sheet of TANs). Like the 
two-factor authentication devices, TAN s would ensure that customers are not 
vulnerable to cracker attacks, as obtaining a log-on, password and one-use code 
from a device or TAN sheet would not necessarily provide a cracker access to 
the customer's account. The one-use codes constantly change. Similar results 
could be achieved by issuing customers a card with an indexed grid on it. To 
log on to online banking, a customer would need to look up grid references and 
enter the corresponding character. Because the grid reference would be 
218 See, for example, Wikipedia, above n 27, " Biometrics" . 
219 See above n 131 , and accompanying text. 
220 See, for example, Wikipedia , above n 27, "TAN (banking)" . 
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different each time, this would amount to a one-use code that would prevent 
cracker attacks. 221 
Any of the above approaches would provide much greater security. This would 
obviously benefit customers, who currently wear the large majority of the risk 
for unauthorised transactions. But it is also likely to benefit banks too. By 
providing much greater technical security, banks are better-insulated from the 
potential legal and evidential challenges of a fraudster attempting to exploit the 
advice for customers discussed above. 222 Better security measures may also 
enable banks to argue that, in fact, the security, authorisation and fault 
presumptions do apply. If online banking is in fact secure, and there are no 
other possible ways the security of online banking can be compromised, these 
presumptions would be well-founded and the criticisms levelled in this paper 
unjustified. 
IX CONCLUSION 
This paper considered the regime for online banking that operates in New 
Zealand. An analysis of the contractual terms that govern the bank-customer 
relationship revealed that the current framework is heavily weighted in favour 
of banks at the expense of their customers. The purpose of the terms is to create 
presumptions that shift essential elements of the burden of proof from the bank 
to the customer. This paper endeavoured to point out the difficulties this 
framework poses for a customer trying to have an unauthorised withdrawal 
refunded. 
Shifting this burden of proof is based on the premise that online banking is 
secure. But this paper argues that this is an incorrect premise. Online banking 
is not secure. It is subject to weaknesses in both bank practices and cracker 
attacks. However, the potential vulnerabilities and the fundamental 
misunderstanding of the purpose of the technical security measures adopted by 
online banking means that customers may not be without redress. This paper 
22 1 See, for example, Entrust Inc. <http://www.entrust.com> (last accessed 25 January 2006). 
222 See above page 37 and following. 
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presented some advice to customers in the position of Gus Tommer, a victim of 
an unauthorised transaction. The weaknesses due to bank practices and bank 
security measures may enable Gus to challenge his unauthorised transaction. 
The paper also offered some advice for banks. A survey of some comparative 
overseas jurisdictions showed that it is not necessary for contractual terms to be 
weighted so heavily in favour of banks. It is hoped that some of these 
considerations will be adopted in the current review of the Code of Banking 
Practice. In particular, this paper has pointed out the need to provide that 
customers are only liable for "blameworthy breaches". Shifting elements of the 
burden of proof back to banks would also be desirable. Banks are far better 
placed than customers to bear the risk of unauthorised transactions. It would 
also incentivise banks to do everything (economically) possible to reduce the 
risk of unauthorised transactions in online banking. 
This paper also suggested some technical measures that banks should adopt. 
These measures would go a long way towards addressing the potential 
vulnerabilities of current systems raised in this paper. In doing so, banks may 
be able to insulate themselves against potential challenges to the current system 
as well as providing a greater security for customers. Two-factor authentication 
is a major enhancement that could be readily adopted. Greater technical 
security may overcome the need to make the sort of legal changes canvassed by 
this paper. However, technical security measures do not yet seem to have 
reached a point where they can absolutely guarantee the integrity of online 
banking and guard against every conceivable cracker attack. 
Combining the legal and technical suggestions of this paper would potentially 
insulate banks against challenges by customers, while also ensuring greater 
practical security for online banking and a fairer and more-balanced approach 
for both customers and banks. 
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF DEFINED CONCEPTS USED IN THIS PAPER 
The following concepts (in order of occurrence) are defined and used by this 
paper: 
Mandate clause: clause in online banking express terms providing that use of 
a customer's log-on and password amounts to mandate. See page 15. 
Notification clause: clause in online banking express terms providing that a 
customer is not liable for any unauthorised transactions that occur after 
notifying the bank of a potential security breach. See page 16. 
No liability clause: clause in online banking express terms providing the range 
of circumstances where customers will not be liable for unauthorised 
transactions. Includes provisions relating to transactions occurring before 
registration, fraud on the part of bank staff ("no liability (fraud)") or where 
there are technical faults or errors in the online banking systems ("no liability 
(error)"). See page 16. 
Limited liability clause: clause in online banking express terms proving the 
range of circumstances where a customer will be able to limit his or her 
liability for unauthorised transactions. Includes provisos relating to fraud, 
negligence and breaching terms and conditions (the provisos to the limited 
liability clause) See page 16. 
Password clause: clause in online banking express terms providing that a 
customer is obliged to safeguard passwords. In the context of EFTPOS and 
credit cards, also includes physical security of the card. See page 18. 
Security presumption: presumption that an instruction to make a transaction 
on a customer' s account has been made using that customer's log-on and 
password. Stems from the proposition that the technical security measures 
implemented by banks make online banking secure. See page 19. 
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Authorisation presumption: presumption that transactions are authorised by 
the customer if the con-ect log-on and password are used. Combination of 
mandate clause and security presumption. See page 20. 
Fault presumption: presumption that the customer is at fault for unauthorised 
transactions, either by being negligent in his or her security practices or 
breaching the password clause. Combination of security presumption, rebuttal 
of authorisation preswnption and password clause. See page 22. 
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APPENDIX 2: TABULAR COMPARISON OF JURISDICTIONS 
New Zealand The United Australia The United 
Kingdom States 
Contract, self Contract, self Contract, Primarily 
Regime 
regulatory code regulatory code government- statute, some 
sponsored code contractual 
terms 
Mandate Presumption that correct log-on and password amounts to mandate 
Limited to Limited to £50, Limited to Limited to 
NZ$50, other other than where A$ l 50, other US$50 if 
Liability for 
than where fraudulent or than where reported to bank 
unauthorised 
fraudulent, failed to take fraudulent or within two days 
transactions 
negligent, reasonable care failed to comply of noticing 
(other than 
breached terms (e.g. breach of with password unauthorised 
those where no 
and conditions password clauses transaction or 
liability applies, 
or otherwise clauses) $500 if reported 
contributed to to bank within 
e.g. fraud of 
the loss (e.g. sixty days of 
bank staff) 
breach of periodic account 
password statement 
clauses) 
Must Must take Must not act Must not 
(absolutely) reasonable care with "extreme " furnish" 
keep password to keep carelessness", password 
confidential , password must make 
Security 
choose confidential , reasonable 
appropriate choose attempts to 
password, not appropriate protect security 
write password password, not of written record 
down etc. write password of password 
down etc. 
Correct log-on and password amounts to mandate 
Customer to detect and report unauthorised transactions 
System secure, Bank must show Bank must show Bank must show 
therefore an customer' s customer' s transaction 
unauthorised fraud or fraud or authorised, 
transaction must negligence negligence, all evidence of 
be result of (though note reasonable machine / 
customer' s that approach evidence, computer record 
Presumptions/ 
fraud or not universally including not conclusive 
negligence adopted), reasonable evidence in 
burden of proof 
unless the possible explanations for itself 
customer proves presumption transactions, 
otherwise that must be 
unauthorised considered 
transaction must 
be result of 
customer' s 
fraud or 
negligence 
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